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The Constant Factort: Judicial Review of the Fact
Finding Process in the Circuit Courts of Appeals
James T. Carney*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, a lower court or a trial court has two main functions: it
finds facts, and it issues laws.1 When a trial judge sits without a jury, he
performs both functions. When a trial judge sits with the jury-that
peculiar institution of Anglo-American jurisprudence-he performs
only one of these functions. He issues the law, but the jury finds the
facts. The reasons for this divergence of function are more historical
than rational. Nevertheless, the jury, because it brings to the fact-finding
process the collective experience of twelve individuals drawn from the
whole spectrum of society,2 may be better able to resolve questions of
credibility and enunciate community standards of conduct than a single
judge from the upper stratum of society. 8 In theory, the jury is restricted
to finding the facts which are relevant to the law given to them in the
judge's instructions and to applying this law to these facts to reach a
generalized verdict. In practice, however, its role expands. Indeed, the
t Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 AM. ScH. REV. 229 (1927):
There is a constant factor in the cases which is susceptible of sound and satisfying
study. The predictable element in it all is what the courts have done in response to
stimuli of the facts of the concrete cases before them. Note not the judge's opinions,
but which way they decide cases, will be the dominant subject matter of any truly
scientific study of law.
Id. at 230.
U B.A., Yale University; LL.B., Yale Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne
University School of Law.
1. Of course, in one sense, the two processes are inseparable. One cannot find relevant
facts unless one has some idea of the requirements of the law which makes them relevant,
whereas one cannot issue statements of law without having some idea of the facts which
call into play the particular rules of law one is to issue. See Richardson v. Gregory, 281
F.2d 626 (D.C, Cir. 1960).
2, There is real doubt as to whether a jury can be said to represent a spectrum of
society when many groups of people by practice and statute are prevented from sitting on
a jury. See G. WnL~utms, THE PRooF oF GuLT 271.72 (3d ed. 1963).
3. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fiction?, 21 U. CHI. L. REY. 386, 388
954) [hereinafter cited as Broederj; Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VANm. L.
EV. 150, 154 (1952). Another justification for the jury system is a political one; there
is some possibility that a jury may protect the democratic nature of a society by
acting as a check on the attempts by a government to repress dissent. Erskine's successful defense of the Whigs in jury trials prevented the government of Pitt the Younger
from repressing all dissent in England in the 1790's. R. TREV FxEAN, Loan GRY AND
THE REFORM BiLL, 83-88 (1952). Possibly, the experience of serving on a jury may be a significant civic experience.
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real significance of the jury may come from its occasional intrusion
4
into the law-issuing process to mitigate the severity of the law.
The jury protects the Court. It's a question how long any
system of courts could last in a free country if judges found the
verdicts. It doesn't matter how wise and experienced the judges
may be. Resentment would build up every time the findings didn't
go with current notions of prejudices. Pretty soon, half the community would want to lynch the judge. There's no focal point
with a jury; the jury is the public itself. That's why a jury can say
when a judge couldn't, "I don't care what the law is, that isn't
right and I Won't do it." It's the great prerogative of free men.
They have to have a way of saying that and making it stand. They
may be wrong, they may refuse to do things they ought to do; but
freedom just to be wise and good isn't any freedom. We pay a
price for lay participation in the law; but it's a necessary expense5
Although on some occasions the jury's ability to go beyond the law
may supply the oil which keeps the judicial system in operation, its
propensity to do so has led to the invention of a number of legal
tests and devices designed to limit and control its power. 6 The rules
of evidence regulate the information given to the jury.7 Rules affecting
the conduct of parties, attorneys, judges, jurors, and press regulate the
atmosphere in which the jury receives such information.8 The "sufficiency of the evidence" test controls the cases and issues which are
submitted to a jury. 9 Finally, the motion for a new trial provides a
method of overturning a jury verdict which is against the weight of
the evidence. 10 These jury control devices place a limit on the jury
"lawlessness.""'
4. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 81 (1944).
5. J. COZZENS, Tim JUST AND THE.UNJUST 427-28 (1942); see Curtis, The Trial Judge
and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 150, 155-56 (1952). See also H. KALVEk & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 193-344, 381-410 (1966) [hereinafter cited as KALVEN & ZEISEL], for a discussion of jury "legislation" in America.
6. James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REy. 218 (1961). Although developed for the purpose of controlling the
jury in theory, at least, these controls are equally applicable to non-jury trials as well as
jury trials; in practice, however, they are applied strictly only in jury trials. See J.
MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60 (1954).
7. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 509 (1898); see
Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 247 (1936).
The rules of evidence also serve a secondary purpose of conserving time by limiting the
introduction of irrelevant material.
8. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of
a Criminal Case, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 946 (1954).
9. See James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Control Devices Available Before
Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961).
10. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 312-14 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES]. To some ex-
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The Fact Finding Process
In our federal judicial system, the main reviewing bodies are the
circuit courts of appeals. 12 These courts are entrusted with the review of
both the law-issuing and the fact-finding process conducted at the trial
level. Theoretically, the circuit courts do not distinguish between the
significance of their review of the law-issuing process and their review
of the fact-finding process. In actuality, they are far more concerned
with the supervision of the law-issuing process than the fact-finding
process. There are perhaps two reasons for this development. First, it
is more interesting intellectually to concern oneself with the development of sweeping abstract principles than it is to concern oneself with
the finding of some rather mundane facts. Second, it is easier for the
circuit courts to supervise the issuance of legal rules than the finding
of facts. They are given the power to review the end product of the
law-issuing process whether the end product takes the form of a trial
judge's conclusions of law or his instructions to the jury. Similarly, in
non-jury civil cases they are given the power to review the end product
of the fact-finding process when this end product is embodied in the
findings of fact set forth by the trial court. 13 The case is far different,
however, in a jury civil case or in a criminal case. In these cases
the circuit courts have no power to review the jury's verdict, which
is the end product of the fact-finding process. Such direct review
14
is viewed as inconsistent with the nature and the purpose of the jury.
The best the circuit courts can manage is indirect review through their
supervision of the trial judges' administration of jury control devices.
It is no wonder then that the circuit courts have tended to regard their
tent, the selection individuals for juries has an effect on the fact-finding process; jury selection as a jury control device, however, is beyond the scope of this article. See Note, The
Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970). For voir dire controls, see Fritz v. Boland &
Cornelius, 287 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1961). Also, the motion for a new trial is a jury control
device not considered in this article.
11. Broeder, supra note 3, at 396-97.
12. The circuit courts handle appeals from various specialized courts and administrative agencies as well as appeals from the district courts. In 1966 & 1967, 2,639 of the 15,086
cases handled by the circuit courts involved administrative appeals. See Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to Function of Review and the
Natural Law, 82 HARV. L. REv.542 (1969).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), requires the appellate courts to accept such findings "unless
clearly erroneous." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir.
1945).
14. As used in this article, "direct review" refers to a system of review pursuant to
which the reviewer examines the conclusions of the fact finder and approves or disapproves of them on the merits; "indirect review" refers to a system where the reviewer examines not the conclusions of the fact findei but only the process by which he arrived at
such conclusion. It is quite clear that the circuit courts have the power of direct review in
non-jur civil
cases. It is not dear whether they have such a power in terms of non-jury
criminal cases.
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task of supervising the fact-finding process in jury cases with some
disdain. Nevertheless, the fact-finding process is as important, if not
more important, than the law-issuing process. Indeed, a dictator could
easily say: "I don't care who makes the laws, as long as I find the facts."
For this reason, the role of the circuit courts in the fact-finding process
is a significant one.
It should be noted, however, that the role of the circuit courts in
supervising the fact-finding process at the trial level or, indeed, in
performing any other function, has seldom attracted the attention of
legal scholars."" As perhaps the most significant and least publicized
branch of our federal judicial system, the eleven United States circuit
courts of appeals deserve more systematic consideration. 10 The purpose
of this article is to remedy this situation in part by a thorough exami1
nation of their supervision of the fact-finding process at the trial level. 7
15. In the period 1958-1961, for example, the Index to Legal Periodicals lists but one
article dealing with the circuit courts but one hundred and eight dealing with the Supreme Court. For two excellent contributions to our understanding of the circuit courts,
see Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L Rav. 542 (1969); Note, The Second Circuit:
FederalJudicial Administration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L. REy. 874 (1963).
16. See Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
CHI. L. REv. 211 (1957), for an elaboration of a similar need In respect to state appellate
courts.

17. For the purpose of this article, the author has examined all cases decided by the
Second Circuit in the period September 1960-August 1964 (vols. 282-36), and by the District of Columbia Circuit in the period October 1957-September 1961 (vols. 249-90). These
two courts were selected for this study partly because they are probably the two most distinguished circuit courts in the country and partly because their differing attitudes towards the criminal law results in a different treatment of their task of supervising the

fact-finding process. See Loeb, JudicialBlocs and Judicial Values in Civil Liberties Cases
Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, 14 AM. L REv. 146, 148 (1965). See also Karlen, The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 17 Rac. OF N.Y.C. B. Ass'W 500 (1962); tables V

and VI, Appendix infra. The two periods in question were selected because the personnel
on both courts during the respective periods was relatively constant. Present on the Second Circuit in September 1960 were Lumbard, Clark, Waterman, Moore, Friendly, Smith
(Judges) and L. Hand, Swan, Chase, Medina, and Hincks (Senior Judges); at the end only
Clark (Judge), L Hand (Senior Judge) and Hincks (Senior Judge) had departed to be replaced by Kaufman, Hayes and Marshall (judges). Present on the District of Columbia
Circuit in the beginning were Edgerton, Prettyman, Miller, Brazelon, Fahy, Washington,
Danaher, Bastian and Burger; there were no changes in court personnel during this
study. The method of research used in this article invoved two steps. First, the briefs of
both parties were read for alleged errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence, application of the sufficiency of the evidence test, and misconduct on the part of a judge
or attorney. In any case, where such errors were alleged, the circuit court opinon was
read to determine the circuit court's treatment of the alleged errors Finally, the circuit
court's view of the verdict was examined. If the opinion did not indicate the court's
view of the verdict, the record was checked to get the author's "objective" evaluation
of the result of the fact-finding process (credit for the origination of this approach
should be given to A. Sizisty, Esq., Yale Law School 1967). This study was restricted to
jury and non-jury civil and criminal cases appealed to the circuits in question; it does
not encompass certain other appeals which involve similar problems. Examples of such
appeals include: United States v. Lieber, 336 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1964) (28 US.C. § 1651 (1970)
hearing-significance of demeanor evidence); Hollander v. Hollander, 318 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.
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The Fact Finding Process
This examination of the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit has led to the conclusion that there exists a great difference
between the theory and the practice of appellate supervision of the
fact-finding process. In theory, the circuit courts utilize the same set of
control devices to supervise the fact-finding process whether it is
conducted by a judge or a jury. In theory, the circuit courts examine
the application for these control devices in a vacuum, without examining the results produced by them except to the extent the devices
themselves necessitate such an examination. In practice, however, things
turn out differently.
The circuit courts tend to neglect and ignore the indirect control
devices in civil cases tried by judges since they can control the factfinding in non-jury civil trials by direct review. Likewise, they tend
to manipulate the jury control devices in cases tried by juries so that
these devices are used not as a means of regulating the process itself, but
as a means of controlling the end product of the process. This is
achieved by a refusal of circuit courts to invoke these controls in cases
in which they find themselves in agreement with the jury verdict, and
by the willingness of the circuit courts to invoke these controls in cases
in which they find themselves in disagreement with the jury verdict.
What follows then is an examination of how the courts in fact apply
the jury control devices to regulate the results of the fact-finding
process.
II.

A.

THE NON-JURY TRIAL

Rules of Evidence's

The rules of evidence are designed to limit the trier of fact to
1963) (contempt hearing-significance of demeanor evidence); S.O.S. Sheet Metal Co. v.
Hackensack Plumbing Supply Co., 297 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1961) (motion to transfer proceedings-hearsay problem); Yin-Shing Woo v. United States, 288 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1961)
(naturalizaton case-mixed question of law and fact and problem of appropriate standard
for review). Occasionally, cases of this nature are referred to in this article to illustrate
a certain problem.
It should be noted that the parenthetical remarks following the citations in the footnote's do not necessarily mean that the information in the parenthetical remark can be
found in the decision which is cited. This information was obtained from briefs, records,
and unreported distrtct court opinions. It is included to indicate the courts' or the author's
"objective" evaluation of the case.
18. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 26, the federal courts in criminal cases follow common law
rules of evidence except as otherwise provided by the federal rules themselves or by an
act of Congress. This power may also be subject to constitutional limitations. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1969). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), the federal courts in civil
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material which is relevant and trustworthy. 19 The approach followed
by circuit courts with respect to allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings

made in the course of a non-jury trial is perhaps best illustrated by the
opinion of the Second Circuit in United States v. Martinez.2 There,

the trial judge in a non-jury narcotics case had questioned the defendant's attorney as to defendant's prior criminal record. The attorney
did not admit that defendant possessed such a record but by referring
to the defendant's refusal to take the stand suggested that defendant
feared that his presence on the witness stand would result in the revelation of his record. 21
The Second Circuit, confronted on appeal with the claim that the

trial judge had thus erroneously received evidence of prior crimes of
defendant, found two grounds for affirmation. First, the court sophistically held that defendant's criminal record had not been admitted
into evidence.22 Second, it ruled that the evidence, even if admitted,
had not prejudiced the defendant since the judge seemed to have
when a
excluded it before reaching a verdict. 23 The court said, "...

case is tried without a jury, the error of admitting incompetent evidence
will be regarded as harmless if it is rejected or excluded by the judge
24
before the decision is made."

Although laconic in this case as to how a circuit court was to determine whether or not a trial judge had excluded from consideration
evidence which he had erroneously admitted, the Second Circuit indicated its resolution of this problem in United States v. Mitchell.25

There, the trial judge, trying a narcotics case without a jury, had questioned the defendant about details of his prior criminal record which
cases will admit any evidence admissable under the state evidentiary rules unless federal
statutes or federal equity practice applies. For a discussion of this rule, see Hope v.
Hearst Consol. Publications Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961).
19. Certain exclusionary rules such as FED. R. Civ. P. 41(e), are not evidentiary rules in
the sense that they prohibit the production of certain evidence for constitutional reasons
and not because such evidence is irrelevant or untrustworthy.
20. 333 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. Ordinarily, evidence relating to defendant's criminal record is inadmissible. Once
a defendant takes the stand, the prosecution may proffer his criminal record for the purpose of impeachment. J. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON TmE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 157(10) (1954).
Consequently, the defendant who has an imposing record seldom testifies on his own behalf for fear that the advantage gained by his testimony would be outweighed by the disadvantage stemming from the revelation of his criminal record. See discussion of the rationale of this rule in Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689, 690-91 (4th Cir. 1952). Defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction limiting the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes. See Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960).
22. 333 F.2d at 82.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 297 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1962).
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had been properly admitted into evidence. The Second Circuit rebuked
the trial judge's display of curiosity, saying:
Though we do not approve of the introduction into evidence
of this irrelevant information, we again point out that this was a
one day trial before a judge sitting without a jury and we are
constrained to believe that the judge was not prejudiced against
this narcotics suspect by the detailed knowledge .... 26
This case illutrates the time-honored presumption 27 that a trial judge
does not utilize erroneously admitted evidence in rendering his verdict.
28
As a general proposition, this presumption seems highly dubious.
Applied to the particular circumstances of this case it seems exceedingly improbable. Kalven and Zeise129 have noted that one major
cause of judge-jury disagreement (judge would have convicted when
jury acquitted) is the judge's possession of information about the
defendant's previous criminal record. 80
Unfortunately, evidence of prior crimes is not the only kind of
suasive evidence which, if erroneously received, is still presumed to
have been excluded by the trial judge in reaching his final decision.
Hearsay evidence is also covered by this presumption. In Mitchell, a
government agent had testified, without objection from defense counsel,
that an informer had identified the defendant by name as a narcotics
pusher. On appeal, defendant's new counsel urged that this testimony
was hearsay. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal on the grounds
that the error was not of sufficient scope to justify invocation of the
"plain error" rule,3 1 thus once again indicating its conviction that the
26.

Id. at 408.

27. J. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMNCK].

28. "A judge has not such control over his mental faculties that he can definitely determine whether or not inadmissible evidence he has heard will affect his mind ....
"
Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (1943). See Maguire & Epstein, Rules of
Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 YAs.E L.J. 1101, 1115 (1927).

29. See note 221 infra.
30. Another case illustrating the Second Circuit's approach to evidence of prior crimes
in non-jury trials is United States v. Cimino, 321 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 974 (1964). Here, defendant's counsel had requested the trial judge to order the government to turn over to the defense certain statements which allegedly fell within the
provisions of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). In order to rule on the defense motion, the trial judge commenced to read the documents in question. While reading these
materials, he learned of the defendant's prior record. The Second Circuit held that his
action did not violate the rule against the admission of evidence regarding prior crimes,
partly because it felt to rule otherwise would be to create a horrible imbroglio in any
case involving Jencks Act statements, and partly because it believed that the trial judge
was not prejudiced by the material which he had uncovered.
31. 297 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1962). FE. R. CalM. P. 52b, provides, "Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the atten-
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trial judge would not have been influenced by the introduction of
erroneous evidence.
The employment of this presumption is almost an automatic response
by the circuit court to any allegation that a trial court sitting without
a jury admitted erroneous evidence.8 2 Although the theoretical justification for ignoring evidentiary rulings in such cases is not sound, the
pragmatic justification is, however, obvious: since the circuit courts
are free to review directly the findings of fact by the trial judge, they
feel it is inane to subject the trial judge's fact-finding process to the
same indirect controls as the jury fact-finding process. Of course, the
presumption obviously cannot apply when the trial judge erroneously
excludes evidence. The circuit courts do reverse in such cases, a fact
which leads trial judges to admit all evidence not clearly incompetent
but to base their findings only on the clearly admissible testimony.33
Not surprisingly, during the period covered by this survey the only
reversals of non-jury cases on evidentiary grounds occurred in two
cases where the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, 4 and in a
case where the trial judge ignored the evidence presented to him by
both sides and based his decision on information he discovered in the
course of his researches in the New York Public Library.8 5
B.

The Atmosphere Regulations

The rules regulating the conduct of the attorneys and the judge
during the trials are the particular product of the jury system. It is not
tion of the court." Id. By decision, courts will recognize plain error in civil cases. Troupe
v. Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. United States v. Kane, 322 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1963) (hearsay); United States v.
Cimino, 321 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963) (prior crimes); United States v. Fredia, 319 F.2d 853
2d Cir. 1963) (confessions of both defendants); see Unitied States v. Greco, 298 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1962) (prior crimes). For use of this presumption in other circuits, see
McCoamicK, supra note 27, § 60. Sometimes the circuit court simply ignores the problem.
See Oblatore v. United States, 289 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1961) (authentication problem ignored).
Such an approach is particularly questionable when the case is reversed on other grounds
since the problems may reoccur again. See Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (possibly irrelevant evidence). See also Kane v. Branch Motor Export Co.. 290
F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1961) (non-probative evitdence). For an exception, see United States
v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 572 (2d Cir. 1961).
33. McCoRMIcK, supra note 27, § 60.
34. Asheville Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1964); Kirtley
v. Abrams, 299 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
35. United States v. Alvary, 302 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1962). The reason for such judicial
strictness is obvious; unless the information which the trial takes judicial notice of is
in fact common knowledge or a matter of public record, the appellate court will no
longer be able to tell from the record whether the judge's findings of fact are or are
not "dearly erroneous." Thus, the one control device which the circuit courts do enforce
in non-jury trials is the doctrine of judicial notice. See Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv.
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surprising that in the period covered by this survey no non-jury cases
were found in which an appellant had even alleged a violation of the
atmosphere regulations.
C.

Sufficiency of Evidence

The "sufficiency of the evidence" test is designed to regulate the cases
and issues which are submitted to a jury by excluding from the province
of the jury any issue or case in which the evidence presented by a party
would, even if believed, be insufficient to support the verdict requested
by the party. 6 Under the "sufficiency of evidence" test, only the quantity of the evidence is examined; the evaluation of its quality is left
to the purview of the trier of fact.
In a non-jury civil case, a defendant may invoke a special version of
the "sufficiency of the evidence" test by a motion to dismiss at the close
of the plaintiff's evidence. 7 Trial judges in general prefer to deny
such a motion, hear all the evidence in the case, and then render findings of fact upon such evidence. 88 Indeed, in all the cases examined in
the course of this survey, only two cases were found in which the trial
judge granted a motion to dismiss.8 9 On appeal, defendants do not
raise the sufficiency of the evidence question, preferring to attack the
trial judge's findings under the "clearly erroneous" test. This abandonment of the sufficiency of the evidence argument is probably due to the
recognition that the "clearly erroneous" standard duplicates the special
"sufficiency of the evidence" standard.
In a non-jury criminal case, the defendant may raise the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence by a motion for judgment of acquittal at
L. REv. 269 (1944). Thus, in Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 286 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1961), the court discussed at some length the problems involved in judicial
notice of foreign law.
36. The "sufficiency of the evidence" test poses the question of whether the evidence
on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
alleging insufficient evidence, would enable reasonable men to find for such side. See
James, Sugiciency of the Evidence and Other Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The motion to dismiss in a non-jury trial permits the trial
judge to examine the quality as well as the quantity of the plaintiff's evidence. Conse-

quently, a trial judge may grant a motion to dismiss in a non-jury trial although he
could not have properly granted a motion for directed verdict had the case been tried
before a jury. Apparently, this motion is not available to the plaintiff in a non-jury case
although he may employ its equivalent in a jury case. FE. R. Ctv. P. 50.
38. See Shorter v. Adler, 258 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where trial judge went so far
as to ask defendant to withdraw motion to dismiss and then proceeded to make findings
of fact favorable to defendant based on his disbelief on the plaintiff's witnesses.
39. Bevelheimer v. Slick Airways, Inc., 303 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962); Roebling v. Anderson,
257 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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the close of the prosecution's case or at the close of all the evidence. 41
Failure to make such a motion does not waive a claim of error based
on the sufficiency of the evidence since the general plea of "not guilty"
in a non-jury trial is considered to constitute such a motion in view of
the trial judge's obligation to enter judgment of acquittal on its own
motion when appropriate. 41 The "sufficiency of the evidence" standard,
rather than the "clearly erroneous" standard, is invoked on appeal by
the criminal defendant since the appellate court in a non-jury criminal
42
case has no power of direct review.
Since the circuit courts do not have the power of direct review in
non-jury criminal cases, on occasion they manipulate the "sufficiency
of the evidence" test to give them such power. Thus, the District of
Columbia Circuit in Farrarv. United States43 threw out the conviction
of a defendant in a rape case because the testimony of the prosecutrix,
a prostitute, that she had never seen the knife defendant allegedly held
against her during the incident was inherently incredible (that is, the
District of Columbia Circuit did not believe it and discredited her entire testimony).
HI.

JURY TRIALS

A. Rules of Evidence
1. The "Ostrich" Method
Allegations of evidentiary error are often ignored by the circuit
courts. 44 The "ostrich" approach of the courts serves two basic func-

tions. Generally, it is used by the circuit courts as a time-saving device
-as a means of avoiding discussion of allegations which are patently
absurd (in eleven of the cases in which the circuit courts employed this
40.

FED. R. GRIM. P. 29. See note 109 infra.

41. Hall v. United States, 286 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1960).
42. Contra, United States v. Cimino, 321 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1963) (Waterman, J.).
"The standard of appellate review is not, of course, the same as that to be applied by a
trial judge. D'Ercole's conviction must be affirmed unless it was 'clearly erroneous.'"
43. 275 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Miller J., dissenting), petition for rehearing en banc
denied. Id. at 875 (Miller, Danaher, Bastian & Burger, JJ., dissenting).
44. Slavenburg Corp. v. Boston Insurance Co., 332 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1964) (excluded
evidence hearsay); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1964) (real evidence,
relevancy of some testimony); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963)
(relevancy of evidence); United States v. Tufaro, 316 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1963) (excluded
evidence irrelevant); United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962) (evidence obviously irrelevant); Randall v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 289 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(evidence not probative); Lambert Constr. Co. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 288 F.2d 30 (2d
Cir. 1961) (hearsay); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (evidence not probative);
Curtis Features Syndicate v. Time, Inc., 251 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (no objection made
at trial to violation of best evidence rule).
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device, the errors complained of were in the opinion of the author
groundless). Even used in this fashion, however, the device is of
45
dubious merit. Certainly, the use of the device saves the court time,
but then so would a refusal to write an opinion. Surely, an appellant
is entitled in the interests of justice to a more reasoned disposition of
his claim. The "ostrich" approach has, however, a second function
which is far more dangerous than the first. The "ostrich" approach
may be used to ignore clearly erroneous rulings when the circuit court
46
concludes that the jury's verdict was dearly correct.
The "ostrich" approach occurs in cases reversed on other than evidentiary grounds. 47 Time saved by the use of this approach in these
cases may prove highly illusory since the evidentiary problems so
ignored may well reoccur on retrial and even result in a second appeal.
Nevertheless, only one jury case was found in the course of this survey
in which the appellate court, reversing a case on non-evidentiary
grounds, discussed allegations of evidentiary error made by the appellant.48 Indeed, the circuit courts seem to stretch to employ the "ostrich"
device in some cases by choosing to reverse on non-evidentiary grounds
even though evidentiary grounds for reversal are present. For example,
in United States v. Shackney,49 the Second Circuit used a strained
construction of the criminal statute in question to justify reversal on
sufficiency grounds of a case replete with evidentiary error.
2. The Discretion Doctrine
In Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.,50 plaintiff alleged that he
had been injured while loading cargo on a ship because his employer
had established unsafe procedures for loading such cargo. To support
his claims, he sought to -introduce testimony that another employee
45. One could question how much time the circuit courts save by refusing to discuss
allegations of error which could be adequately handled by a sentence or two in the course
of an opinion.
46. Such a result may sometimes be unintentional since the failure to subject a questioned ruling to the hard test of written justification may sometimes result in approval of
a ruling which would otherwise be reversed. However, this fact serves only to illustrate
another danger of the "ostrich" approach even when it is used for only its first purpose.
47. For examples of the courts' usual approach, see Delima v. Trinadad Corp., 302 F.2d
585 (2d Cir. 1962) (authentication problem, hearsay); United States v. Paroutain, 299 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1962) (hearsay, authentication); United States v. Christmann, 298 F.2d 651
(2d Cir. 1962) (allusion to lie detector test); Salem v. United States Lines Co., 293 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1961); Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (relevancy problem,
impeachment by prior crimes); Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 272 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(expert testimony); Hanna v. Fletcher, 261 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
48. Mandel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 291 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1961).
49. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
50. 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962) (jury verdict for defendant clearly justified).
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had protested to one of the supervisors about the allegedly dangerous
procedures some time before his accident. The trial judge refused to
admit either his testimony or the testimony of his fellow worker. The
Second Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling by ruling that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence; it did
admit, however, that ". . . a more liberal concept of relevancy would
have conformed better with modem trends in the law of evidence." 51
In United States v. Licavoli,52 the defendant, accused of contempt of
Congress by virtue of his failure to respond to a subpoena issued by the
McClellan committee, attempted to defend his conduct on the grounds
that his counsel had advised him not to obey the subpoena. Ostensibly
to show that counsel should have known better than to give this advice,
but actually to show that counsel frequently so advised clients being
investigated by Congress, the prosecutor asked the defendant's counsel
if he had ever similarly advised other clients in this situation. The
trial court, over objection, made the counsel answer this question. The
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the trial court's action as a matter
of discretion even though the court sub silentio admitted that the
question was improper when it held that advice of counsel, even if
given in good faith, was not a defense.
In both of these cases, the circuit courts invoked the "abuse of
discretion" doctrine. This doctrine recognizes the fact that certain
matters, including rulings on the relevancy of evidence, cannot be
regulated by a hard and fast rule and consequently must be left to
the discretion of the trial court, whose decision should not lightly be
overturned by the circuit court. This "abuse of discretion" rule gives
the circuit courts a most useful device to review the jury's verdict in
certain cases. In the two cases discussed above, and in other cases
uncovered in the course of this survey, 53 the circuit courts ignored clear
51. Id. at 465 (it should be noted that action was brought by plaintiff's estate).
52. 294 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The court indicates in its opinion that it was quite
dear defendant intended to avoid questions which gave rise to contempt of Congress indictment.
53. For other examples of erroneous rulings upheld by circuit courts under the "discretion" doctrine, see United States v. Crisafi, 504 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1962) (refusal to admit
evidence to explain away prior crime used for impeachment purposes) (Second Circuit
finds ample evidence to support convictions); United States v. Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807
(2d Cir. 1962) (Argentine lawyer who failed Argentine Bar and had no special knowledge
of Argentine custom law permitted to testify as expert thereon) (appellate court indicating
evidence shows defendant acted with "evil" intent in scheme to use mail which resulted
in charge for mail fraud); United States v. Ross, 267 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J.,
dissenting) (refusal to admit evidence that assault charges were dropped although evidence
that assault charges were made admitted) (guilt clear).
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abuses of discretion on the part of the trial court because they agreed
with the jury's verdict. The reluctance of the circuit courts to reverse
for abuse of discretion may be seen by the fact that in the panel covered
by the survey, the Second Circuit reversed only three cases and the
District of Columbia Circuit none on such grounds. 4
3.

Waived Error

Courts normally will refuse to consider on appeal issues not raised
at the trial.55 By rule in criminal cases and by decision in civil cases,
however, they will relax this rule in order to reach errors causing
substantial injustice. As a matter of abstract justice, there is much to be
said in favor of the "waived error" doctrine. Certainly, the general
"waived error" rule is necessary to prevent the complete overloading
of the federal judicial system which would follow if litigants were able
to hedge against adverse jury verdicts by carefully nursing along errors
for presentation on appeal. Similarly, a relaxation of such a doctrine is
necessary in some cases to avoid penalizing a litigant for the incompetence, negligence, or mere carelessness of an attorney who fails to make
timely objection56 to the introduction of improper but highly damaging
evidence. That the circuit courts are reluctant to reverse a decision
where the evidentiary error complained of was not objected to below
is indicated by the fact that during the period covered by this survey
only one case was found in the Second Circuit where the court reversed
57
because of an evidentiary error not subject to objection at trial.
54. United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963) (failure to admit
evidence of comparative sales and evidence of tax stamps to show for what plaintiff actually
sold property) (evidence excluded would have changed jury verdict); Harrington v. Sharff,
305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962) (Clark, J., dissenting) (abuse of discretion to correct misstatemert of fact by counsel in summation through admission of hearsay evidence for the
purpose of rebuttal) (Moore believed the verdict to be wrong and Waterman considered it
a close case); United States v. Turoff, 291 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1961) (abuse of discretion to admit House Un-American Activities Committee transcript showing defendant a Communist
when only part of transcript relevant) (evidence indicates defendant clearly guilty).
55. Cf. Troupe v. Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1956).
56. The objection should be made as soon as the improper evidence is introduced or
proper evidence is used in an improper fashion. United States v. Turoff, 291 F.2d 864, 868
(2d Cir. 1961).
57. See United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1962). The circuit courts are
much more willing to invoke the "plain error" rule in the case of error affecting the instructions. See Ferrara v. Sheraton McAlpin Corp., 311 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1962); Mullen v.
United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where the "plain error" rule was invoked to
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4. Harmless Error
Both federal statute and procedural rule provide that "harmless
error," that is, error which does not affect "the substantial rights of the
parties," should not be a ground for reversal.58 The basis for the
"harmless error" rule is the recognition that many evidentiary rules
are so technical in nature that their violation is almost always nonprejudicial, while other rules of more substantial nature can still, on
a given occasion, be broken without prejudicial effect. There is no little
difficulty, however, in defining what "harmless error" is. The view
followed in most circuits, including the District of Columbia Circuit 59
is one propounded by Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States: 60
[The question is] what effect the error had or reasonably may
be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing
is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men,
not on one's own.
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not
singled out and standing alone.
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the
error did not influence the jury, the verdict and the judgment
should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one
cannot say, after pondering all that happened without stripping
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that
substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely
whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the
phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.61
The Second Circuit uses a different test for harmless error. It reads
the "sufficiency of the evidence" test into the "harmless error" test to
make harmless error depend on whether or not (disregarding the questionable evidence) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of
62
the jury.
Although employing different tests for harmless error, both the
reverse for error regarding instruction but not invoked where testimony had been admitted in violation of the priest-penitent privilege.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); FED. R. CIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
59. United States v. Sanchez, 293 F.2d 260, 267 (8th Cir. 1961); Rosa v. City of Chester,
278 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1960); Starr v. Unted States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
60. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
61. Id. at 764-65.
62. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
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Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit consider harmless
error per se any evidentiary ruling made in connection with a multicount trial resulting in concurrent sentences for each count when there
is no valid allegation of error in respect to the conviction on one
count. 63 Similarly, the Second Circuit holds as harmless per se an evidentiary error made in respect to the issue of damages when the jury
has found against the plaintiff on the liability issue. 64 Likewise, the Second Circuit, in an action where plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie
case, held as harmless error allegedly erroneous rulings which did not
impede the plaintiff's efforts to make out such a case. 65 Presumably, the
District of Columbia Circuit would have reached the same result in
these cases under its own test for harmless error.
The use of different tests, however, leads to different results in some
cases. In United States v. Vardine,66 the prosecution had used the net
worth method to prove that defendants had been cheating on their
income taxes in 1953 and 1954. The Second Circuit reversed conviction on the first count on the grounds that the figures the Government placed in evidence to show a gap between actual and reported
income were based on an erroneous interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code's provisions concerning actual income and that the
apparent gap could have been accounted for completely by an error
in the Government's figures.6 7 The Second Circuit refused to reverse
on the second count:
Although the jury might have been relying on the apparent
1953 bulge, which we have found to be at least partially erroneous, as proof of willfulness in 1954, the other proof of defendant's
intent was sufficient to preclude reversal as to 1954. The fact that
defendant consistently failed to report his dividend income and
cashed Star's checks without recording them on the books or
reporting them on his return coupled with the consistent net
worth bulges for the four years preceding the prosecution years
63. United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962); Martin v. United States, 271
F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Langford v. United States, 268 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1959). An
exception is made by the District of Columbia Circuit in the case when the evidence erroneously admitted on one count may influence verdict on other counts. See text, section
111(4) supra.
64. Cisneros v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 334 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1964); Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962); Nielsen v. Kurz & Co., 295 F.2d 692 (2d Cir.
1961).
65. Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1962).
66. 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962) (according to the Second Circuit, evidence of guilt was
adequate).
67. Id. at 66.
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make the $1,999 error in 1953 insignificant in proving willfulness
as to 1954. 68

The District of Columbia Circuit, employing its "harmless evidence"
test, presumably would have reversed. For example, in Taylor v.
United States, 9 the District of Columbia Circuit ruled, "We shall
reverse the conviction of appellant Taylor on the conspiracy count
because of the erroneous admission of this prejudicial evidence of the
undercover agent. And since it is quite probable that this evidence was
also considered by the jury in connection with the related count two,
charging Taylor with the operation of a lottery, we shall also reverse
the conviction of Taylor on that count," even though there was sufficient evidence against Taylor on that count to sustain a conviction. °
Perhaps the major significance of the "harmless error" rule is that
it furnishes an appellate court, examining a claim that the fact-finding
process was defective, with a legitimate reason for examining the result
of that process and making its determination of the validity of the
process after consideration of such a result. The circuit courts are not
slow to manipulate the "harmless error" rule to reverse jury verdicts
of which they disapprove even though no prejudicial error exists.
In Edmonds v. United States,71 where the trial judge permitted both
a policeman and defendant's doctor to testify that defendant had confessed his participation in the crime to them, the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that the trial court erred in permitting the doctor to
testify because of the privilege rule.7 2 It refused to consider this error

harmless even though the testimony of the doctor was cumulative to
that of a policeman. In Fenwick v. United States,78 where the trial judge
had permitted the prosecutor to impeach the defendant with a conviction which was being appealed, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the trial court had erred; it refused to hold this error
harmless even though the conviction had since been finalized.7 4 In
United States v. Turoff, 75 the Second Circuit reversed the contempt
68.

Id.

69. 260 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (fairly close case when questionable evidence not considered). See Dancy v. United States, 276 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
70. 260 F.2d at 738.
71. 260 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Miller, Bastian & Danaher, JJ., dissenting) (evidence
fairly clear that defendant was emotionally disturbed).
72. Id. at 478.
73. 252 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Bastian, J., dissenting). The majority viewed government case as weak since it was "developed through two alleged accomplices who had
grounds for hostility." Id. at 125.
74. Id. at 126.
75. 291 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1961).
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of Congress conviction of a war veteran, who had refused to inform
the House Un-American Activities Committee of the names and addresses of his Communist friends, on the ground that the trial court
had erroneously admitted into evidence the transcript of the defendant's entire testimony before the Committee. In so doing, the Second
Circuit did not consider the possibility that this error was "harmless"
since there was sufficient other evidence for the jury to find the
defendant guilty. Of course, the circuit courts manipulate the "harmless error" rule in the other direction also; on occasion they hold
76
plainly prejudicial errors to be harmless.
5. Cured Error
Another device used by circuit courts confronted with allegations of
error in evidentiary rules is the "cured error" doctrine. Briefly stated,
this doctrine permits the circuit courts to consider as "cured" any
error by a trial judge which the latter recognizes and corrects. No
problem occurs when the error "cured" is an error involving the exclusion of properly admissible evidence since a trial judge can rectify such
an error by simply reversing his stance and letting the evidence come
in. The problem occurs in terms of evidence improperly admitted.
Frequently, the trial judge can remedy his error of admitting evidence
which should not have been admitted by striking such evidence from
the record and issuing a "curative" instruction to the jury, ordering
them to ignore the evidence in question. In such a case, the circuit
courts generally will hold that the instruction in question "cured" the
76. Lewis v. Chapman, 265 F2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (admission of inapplicable statute
to show standard of care in a negligence case) (plaintiff probably guilty of contributory
negligence which was reflected by small jury verdict); Capitol Products v. Romer, 252 F.2d
843 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (admission of evidence in negligence case of change by defendant in
procedures alleged to be responsible for plaintiff's injury) (defendant obviously negligent).
One further tendency in the circuit courts' use of the "harmless error" rule should be
noted. Often, the courts do not discuss the alleged errors but simply issue a blanket ruling
holding that it finds "no error affecting substantial rights." The District of Columbia Circuit is a particular employer of this combination of the "harmless error" rule and the
"ostrich" approach. Phillips v. Kitt, 290 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (relevancy); Key v. United
States, 284 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (trial judge refused to let defendant in murder case
substantiate self-defense claim by introducing evidence concerning character of defendant);
Weinheimer v. United States, 283 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (trial judge's ruling violated the
best evidence rule); Duckworth v. Helms, 268 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (hearsay); Love v.
United States, 259 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Kornegay v. United States, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (admissions); Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Chase v.
United States, 256 F.2d 891 (1958) (hearsay). The Second Circuit also uses such a device on
occasion. See Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 526 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964) (questionable admission of doctor's report under business records exception to the hearsay rule);
Polara v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 284 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960) (questionable exclusion of
police report which might have come in under business records exception to hearsay rule).
This approach is open to the same criticisms as the "ostrich" method.
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original error by erasing this material from the mind of the jury." On
occasion, however, it seems doubtful that the instruction has the
curative effect intended. It seems probable that a jury will obey a
curative instruction which tells them to ignore evidence which they
themselves would consider to be of doubtful value because of its lack
of relevance or inherent untrustworthiness. When the evidence in
question would seem both relevant and trustworthy, however, it seems
unlikely that a curative instruction will have much effect. Indeed, it
is possible that a curative instruction in some circumstances may even
have a detrimental effect by drawing the attention of the jury to a
matter which otherwise might have gone unnoticed or might have
been deemed to be less significant by the jurors.7 8 Consequently, the
circuit courts may, in appropriate circumstances, rule that the curative
instruction was not sufficiently curative to erase the original error and
thus reverse the verdict of the trial court.79 Thus, the power of the
circuit court to relax the "cured error" doctrine, like its power to relax
the "waived error" doctrine, enables the circuit courts to review the
jury's verdict and by a manipulation of this doctrine reverse or affirm
as the court feels justified. In Turrof, for example, the Second Circuit
refused to consider as sufficiently curative the trial court's instruction
to the jury not to consider the fact that the House Un-American
Activities Committee transcript, which had been erroneously admitted
into evidence, indicated the defendant was a Communist. On the other
hand, in Davis v. United States,80 the District of Columbia Circuit
followed the common practice in conspiracy cases of holding that a
trial judge's instruction to disregard certain statements made by one
77. E.g., James v. United States, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (instruction cured error
which occurred when witness testified he identified defendant from mug shot) (defendant
clearly guilty).
78. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959),
noting effect of curative instruction in civil case where evidence that defendant is insured
is inadvertently admitted and then striken from the record. E.g., Brief for Appellant at
2-3, James v. United States, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
79. See United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1962) (prior crimes); Taylor v.
United States, 260 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (declaration of alleged co-conspirator when no
conspiracy proved may have been used in terms of substantial count even though jury instructed not to use it).
80. 274 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule,
statement of a conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be used against co-conspirators. However, participation by the alleged co-conspirator must be proved by other independent evidence before such statement can be used against him. The trial judge often
permits the prosecutor to vary the proof and present the statement before proving participation.
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member of a conspiracy about the activities of the others had the effect
of erasing this matter from the minds of the jury.8'
6. Rule Making
Inherent in the nature of jury control devices is the power of the
courts, particularly the appellate courts, to change the devices on a
generalized basis as they see fit. The rules of evidence are the most
complex of the devices as well as the easiest for the courts to change.
So it is not surprising that in the period covered by this survey, both
circuits were quite active in changing, in one degree or another, the
rules of evidence. Such changes, as long as they were on a generalized
basis, are not the subject of this study.8 2 When, however, such changes
were made on an ad hoc basis (constituting a train ticket good for one
ride only) or when such changes involved what seemed to be a studied
ignorance of the impact of the rules in a given case, it seemed obvious
that the circuit courts were using their rule-making power to manipulate the results produced by the trial process.
In Case v. New York Central Railroad Co.,8 3 the Second Circuit
engaged in such a manipulation of the hearsay rule. Here a railroad
official, attempting to rebut the unfavorable presumption which would
81. Id. at 588. If the prosecutor fails to prove participation, the trial court instructs the
jury to ignore the hearsay statement. See MCCORMACK, supra note 27. For another case
where the circuit court was probably over optimistic about the effect of the curative statement, see United States v. Sahadi, 292 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1961). When defendant is responsible for introduction of the evidence, the courts do not question the curative effect of the
instruction. See United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961).
82. Of course, it should be noted that changing the rules on a generalized basis is in
one sense manipulative of the results produced by a trial process since the results produced
by such a process are affected by the rules of evidence which often favor one party as opposed to another.
The liberal District of Columbia Circuit has tended to favor defendants in criminal
cases and plaintiffs in civil cases by its changes in the rules of evidence. In Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the District of Columbia Circuit finally limited
the introduction of evidence of prior crimes for impeachment purposes to crimes involving
the element of falsehood-as if the fact that someone convicted of murder would be as
likely to tell the truth on a witness stand as an individual without a criminal record.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has liberalized the admissions exception of the
hearsay rule in respect to post-accident admissions made by a defendant's agent, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (1961).
Some rule changes reflect the desire on the part of the circuit courts not to favor one
side or another but rather to streamline the fact-finding process by dispensing with
rules which the court views as being without value. For instance, in the Second Circuit,
it appears an accepted practice to accept photostatic copies of documents without the
requirement of authentication. See Brief For Appellant at 16, DeLima v. Trinidad Corp.,
302 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1962); MCCORMACK, supra note 27, §§ 185-94.
83. 329 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964) (evidence dearly in favor of defendant who prevailed
in jury verdict).
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ordinarily be drawn from the railroad's failure to produce its employees who were at the scene of the accident, was permitted by the trial
judge to testify he had asked not only the missing witness but also
some five other employees near the scene whether they had seen the
accident in question and received a negative response from each. The
Second Circuit, over a strong dissent from Judge Hays, ruled that this
testimony was admissible despite the fact that it was offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.8 4 Another example of apparent misapplication of the evidentiary rules occurred in Dancy v. United
States, 5 where the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that an instruction limiting the use of hearsay about defendant's involvement in
narcotics for the purpose of refuting defendant's entrapment defense
was not sufficiently clear. On that basis the court reversed the defendant's conviction on a multi-count indictment.8 6
Certain decisions do not seem readily categorizable as exemplifying
the impact of a new generalized rule or the impact of manipulation.
In United States v. De Sisto,7 the Second Circuit made a formal exception to the general rule that prior inconsistent statements may be used
for impeachment purposes but not as substantive evidence. The court
ruled that the prior inconsistent statement of a government witness
made at an earlier trial, regarding the identification of the defendant,
was admissible as substantive evidence at the second trial on the ground
that it was sufficiently trustworthy since it had been made under oath
and subjected to the test of cross examination.8 On the surface, the
De Sisto decision clearly constitutes a case where the court has made
a generalized change in the rules of evidence for valid substantive
reasons and without any intent to manipulate the rules to justify
affirmance in these cases. It is interesting to note, however, that the
84. Id. at 938.
85. 276 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
86. Id.
87. 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964) (appellate court considered guilt clear).
88. Id. at 934. A number of eminent writers have urged the abolition of the rule that
prior inconsistent statements cannot be used as substantive evidence. United States v.
Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 690 (1931); DiCarlo v. United States, 6
F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1924); see 3 J. WIOMORE, EvmmizDE § 1018
n.2 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 192 (1948). The Supreme Court, in California v. Green, 396 U.S.
1001 (1970), has ruled that a California statute permitting use of prior inconsistent

statements as substantive evidence in some circumstances did not violate the sixth or
fourteenth amendment. There are constitutional problems which would arise if the prior
impeaching statement were one which would not be admissible because of constitutional
exdusionary rules. See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1965). The abolition
of this rule would also pose certain difficult problems in trial preparation. See Weinstein,
The ProbativeForce of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 336 (1961).
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change was necessary to secure conviction of the defendant. Without
the change the conviction would have to have been reversed because,
as the Second Circuit admitted,8 9 the trial judge's instruction on the
limiting effect of the prior inconsistent statement had been both late
and inadequate and because the prior inconsistent statement had to be
considered substantive evidence for the conviction to be sustained
under the "sufficiency of the evidence" test.
Even more difficult to categorize than the De Sisto case are United
States v. Kennedy, 90 United States v. Annunziato,9 1 and United States
v. Isadore Press Co. 92 Viewed in one light, these cases are textbook
cases9" which permit the introduction of evidence under the state of
mind exception when its only relevance was not to show a state of
mind but only to prove the truth of the matter asserted extrajudicially. In Kennedy for example, the Second Circuit upheld the
trial judge, who had permitted a victim of an extortion racket to
testify that other truck drivers had told him that the defendants had
threatened them also, on the theory that this evidence showed the states
of mind of the victims. This it certainly did; unfortunately the state
of mind of the victims were not really relevant to the case. The fact
that the defendants had made such threats was relevant; the problem
was that the testimony was not admissible to prove the making of such
threats. Viewed in another light, however, these cases may represent only
special manipulations of the state of mind exception to uphold the convictions of individuals whom the circuit courts deemed to be guilty. It is
interesting to note that in United States v. Murray94 the defendant was
not able to obtain the benefit of the Kennedy rule. One could raise the
same question about the District of Columbia Circuit's restrictive
interpretation of the rule against impeachment of one's own witness.
In Belton v. United States,9 5 the prosecutor knew that the one witness
to the murder (a witness he was obligated to call), had changed part of
his story but did not know which part. When the witness changed his
89. 329 F.2d at 932.
90. 291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961). "The evidence fairly 'shrieks the guilt of the parties.'"
Id. at 458.
91. 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant clearly guilty).
92. 336 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1964). The court said it was "not even one of the 'close'
cases arising under the Mail Fraud Statute." Id. at 1009.
93. See J. McGuiRE, J. WEIrNSraN, J. CQADBURN & J. MANSFIELD, EvIDENCE (5th ed.
1965).
94. 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962) (ample basis for the jury's rejection of. defendant's
explanation of unreported income).
95. 259 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (en banc with Miller, Bastian & Danaher, JJ., dis.
senting).
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story on the stand to support defendant's claim of self-defense, the prosecutor attempted (by impeachment) to bring out the original story, which
showed an unprovoked attack by defendant. The District of Columbia
Circuit chose to ignore the general rule that the prosecutor's testimony
may impeach any witness he is obligated to call.9 6 The court ruled
that attempts by tthe prosecution to impeach this witness warranted
reversal. 97 One could also question the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in Evans v.United States.98 Defendant in this case claimed that
she had stabbed the victim in her efforts to prevent him from sexually
assaiulting her. The trial court excluded evidence that the deceased
became quarrelsome when under the influence of alcohol (as it seems
he was on the night of his death) and that deceased suffered from
emotional problems and occasionally became deeply depressed. The
District of.Columbia Circuit then adopted the rule that evidence about
a decedent's character for turbulence and violence should be admitted
in a homicide case where the defendant claims self-defense, even
though the defendant had no knowledge of the same.99 It then ruled
that the evidence about the decedent's character should have been
admitted in view of defendant's claim of self-defense t°° even though
the evidence showed only a tendency of the deceased to be quarrelsome
while drinking and not a tendency for him to become sexually aggressive and therefore did not have any bearing on defendant's claim that
she killed decedent because of his attempted sexual assault.
B. "Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. The Test-Civil Cases
In a jury civil case, the' "sufficiency of the evidence" test is brought
into play by a motion for a directed 'verdict which may be made at the
close of the opposing party's case, at the close of all the evidence, or
after the jury verdict is returned.' 0 ' Such motion is made as a matter
96. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950); DiCarlo v. United States,
6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925).
97. The District of Columbia Circuit had to engage in legal gymnastics to hear the
case since no appeal had been properly filed. 259 F.2d at 814-17.
98. 277 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
99. Id. at 354-55. See MCCORMICk, supra note 27, § 160.
100. 277 F.2d at 355.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 50. The "sufficiency of the evidence" test is also brought into play
at earlier stages of a civil proceeding by motions for judgment on the pleadings and
motions for' summary judgment. FEn. R. Civ. P. 12. & 56. A plaintiff is entitled to a
directed verdict when all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defen-
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of course by the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's -case if there
seems to be any possible defect in the prima facie case. Normally, such
a motion is groundless and may be denied out of hand. When the trial
judge concludes that the motion may bejustified, he is placed between
the devil and the deep blue sea. If he grants the motion at this time, he
will save the time and expense of conducting the rest of the trial.
On the other hand, he knows that appellate courts look upon the
granting of such a motion, particularly when it is made at the close of
the plaintiff's case, with disfavor. 102 If he does deny the motion, he can
in effect delay decision of the matter since he can count on its being
renewed at the close of all the evidence. 1 3 If he grants the motion at
that time, he insures himself a more favorable attitude by the circuit
court, which is more inclined to uphold direction of a verdict in a case
where it can review all the evidence and assure itself that the plaintiff
04
has no valid claim, than when it can review only the plaintiff's case.1
if the trial judge does not wish to grant the motion at the close of all
the evidence, he can reserve judgment on it specifically or he can again
dant, would not enable reasonable men to find for other than the plaintiff. The author
found only one case in which plaintiff appealed on the basis that such a motion was improperly denied. See Comer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1963).
102. Trial judges in the District of Columbia Circuit who granted motions for directed
verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case had the following record:
Reversals:
White v. Louis Creative Hairdresser, Inc., 273 F.2d 832 (1959)
Rotan v. Greenbaum, 273 F.2d 830 (1959)
McManus v. Rogers, 273 F.2d 104 (1959)
Kelly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 683 (1959).,
Capanelli v. Grane, 266 F.2d 445 (1959)
Ekberg v. Gifford, 262 F.2d 231 (1958)
Young v. Fishback, 262 F.2d 469 (1958)
Hanna v. Fletcher, 261 F.2d 75 (1958)
Affirmances: Randall v. The Evening Star Newspaper Co., 289 F.2d 880 (1961),
Quick v. Thurston, 290 F.2d 360 (1961)
Taylor v. Crane Rental Co., 254 F.2d 350 (1958)
The trial judges in the Second Circuit do not direct verdicts frequently.
Only four cases were discovered in the course of this study in which a district judge in
the Second Circuit directed a verdict at any point in the trial. Three were reversed:
Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Massa v. Venezuelan Navigacion
Co., 298 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1962); Scholle v. Cuban Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust, 285 F.2d
318 (2d Cir. 1960).
103. Trial judges are seldom reversed for refusing to grant a motion based on 'the
"sufficiency of the evidence" test. For the only cases covered in this survey in which
such reversal occurred, see Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962); Ryan v. Saint Johnsbury & L.R.R., 290 F.2d 350
(2d Cir. 1961).
104. In three of four cases in which trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the action' in contrast with its record
in terms of directed verdict granted at close of plaintiff's case. See Kelly v. Great Ati. &
Pac. Tea Co., 284 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Skinner v. Koontz, 284 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(judgment notwithstanding the verdict upheld); Spann v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 273 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (judgment notwithstariding' the verdict reversed); Williams v. Greenblatt, 272 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict upheld).
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delay by denying it out of hand, confident that it will be renewed
following the return of an adverse jury verdict.10 5 By doing this, the
trial judge accomplishes two things. First, he may eliminate the necessity for ruling on the motion since the jury may take him off the
hook. 08 Second, by obtaining a jury verdict, he obviates the necessity
for a new trial in the event he grants the motion of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and is reversed. 10 Of course, his delay does
increase the time and expense of the trial.
2. The Test-Criminal Cases
In a jury criminal case, the "sufficiency of the evidence" test is raised
by a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which may be made at the
close of the government's case, at the close of the evidence, or after the
jury verdict. 108 Such motion is made as a matter of course in most
criminal cases. It requires the trial judge to examine the evidence
presented by the prosecution to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to justify sending the case to the jury. 10 9 In the District of
Columbia Circuit, and in most circuits, the courts use the test devised
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). If the trial judge reserves decision, the party making the
motion must renew the same following the return of the verdict to empower trial judge to
grant such motion. See Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1962). The
Johnson rule effectively negates the trial judge's power to reserve decision.
106. See Kelly v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 F.2d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Burger,
J., dissenting).
107. Spann v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 273 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was invented for just this purpose. See James, supra
note 10, at 331.
108. FED. R. CiuM. P. 29. Of course, the prosecution is not entitled to a motion for a
directed verdict of conviction because of the sixth amendment. See Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895).
109. As in a civil case, the timing of such a motion may be significant. When the
motion is made at the close of the government's case, the trial judge is required to consider only the evidence presented by the government whereas the motion made at the
dose of all the evidence requires the trial judge to examine all the evidence. This means
that the defendant in some circumstances may repair a deficiency in the prosecution's
case. Once such deficiency is repaired, it can never again be attacked because the defendant, by putting on evidence, waives his objection to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case.
See United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666, 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1948). Of course, defendant
can renew his attack on sufficiency of the evidence by making a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of all the evidence or after the jury verdict, but such attack must
take the government's case as the defendant has repaired it. The defendant's decision as
to put on evidence or not in such a situation is a hard one. See Comment, The Motion
for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151 (1961). The District of Columbia
Circuit has relaxed the harshness of this rule by dropping the waiver requirement and
examining the sufficiency of the evidence solely in terms of the government's case. See
Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Second Circuit and the
other circuit courts hold to the old rule. See United States v. Rosengarten, 357 F.2d
263, 286 (2d Cir. 1966); 2 C. WRIGuT, FEDER.AL PRACTICiE & PROCEDURE § 464 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHTJ. The sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases is a
matter of federal law. See United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1961).
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in Curley v. United States.1 0 This test requires the trial judge, in pass.
ing on a motion for judgment of acquittal, to ".. . determine whether
upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact,
a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a
doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; or to state it
another way, if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind
might fairly conclude guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the motion must
be granted. If he concludes that either of the two results is fairly
possible, he must let the jury decide the matter.""'1 The Second Circuit
employs another test for sufficiency of the evidence. The Second Circuit
test makes the test for sufficiency of the evidence in criminal prosecutions the same as it is in civil cases: ". . . in all criminal prosecutions the
prosecution makes out a sufficient case to go to the jury if the evidence
would have been enough in a civil action, the only difference between
the two being that in the end the evidence must satisfy the jury beyond
any reasonable doubt. '"1 2 Although at least one critic has claimed the
Second Circuit test is based upon the proposition that the defendant
is presumed guilty until proven innocent,"13 a less hysterical view
would indicate that the differences between the two tests are more
4
verbalistic than real."1
In all events, under either test, the trial judge usually denies the
motion for judgment of acquittal out of hand. When he feels that the
motion is justified, however, he is placed in something of a dilemma.
If he grants the motion, he saves the time and expense of completing
the trial (although defendants in criminal cases, unlike defendants in
civil cases, do not take much time in presenting their side of the case).
Since his decision to grant judgment of acquittal is not reviewable, he
need not concern himself about being reversed." 5 The very fact that
110.

160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1947).

111. Id. at 232-33.
112. United States v. Dudley, 260 F.2d 439, 440 (2d Cir. 1958), quoting United States v.
Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1955).
113. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: The Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1159-62 (1960).
114. The extent to which the two tests differ has been called "a largely semantic
dispute apparently intriguing to sciolists." United States v. Leitner, 312 F.2d 107, 108 n.1
(2d Cir. 1963).
115. The fifth amendment has been construed as to prohibit appeal by the government from judgment of acquittal. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (many others have agreed with his position). See Mayers &
Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAav. L. Rav. 1
(1960).
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the Government cannot obtain review of a judgment of acquittal,
however, makes the conscientious trial judge reluctant -to grant such
a motion. 1 0 He may deny the motion in the hope that he may be
taken off the hook by the jury, but otherwise he has nothing to gain by
delay.
3. Appellate Review
The circuit courts treat the "sufficiency of the evidence" test with
far more respect than the rules of evidence. Of course, the circuit courts
do adopt the "ostrich" approach in some criminal cases due to the
tendency of appellant's lawyers to use the "sufficiency of the evidence"
claim as a catch-all, device. 117 The courts in jury criminal cases will
invoke the waiver doctrine when the defendant has failed to move for
judgment of acquittal at the trial."" The circuit courts also use the
"harmless error" rule td avoid discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence in multi-count cases where there is no Valid Allegation.of error in
respect to the conviction on one count.1 9
In general, however, opinions in cases involving the "sufficiency of
the evidence" test discuss the evidence in great detail, Onereason for
such treatment is, of course, the pract'ical difficulty of employing this
test without such discussion. A second reason is the circuit courts'
conviction that error in the application of this test is, unlike error in
application of evidentiary rules, prejudicial per se. A final reason for
such careful employment of.this test is the fact that it comes closer than
any other device to giving the circuit courts the power of direct review.
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, appears unsatisfied with
the power given it by the "sufficiency of the evidence" test. It in116. WiucHr, supra note 109, at 461.
117. The District of Columbia Circuit, which is the main culprit in this respect,
produced no fewer than sixteen "ostrich" opinions out of 72 cases, which avoided, by
means of a general finding of no error or no substantial error, discussing, allegations of
insufficiency of the evidence.
118. See Lee v. United States, 251 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Johnson v. United States,
251 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1958).' The circuit courts do not consider the entrance of a plea
of not guilty in a jury trial the equivalent of a motion for judgment of acquittal as they
do in a non-jury trial. The rationale in difference in treatment is difficult to understand.
WiuGHT, supra note 109, at 266. However, it would seem that. a real case of insufficient
evidence would have to be noticed by the court under F.D. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). See United
States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963); WaIGHT, supra note 109, at 469. The waiver
doctrine is also applied in civil cases when no motion for a directed verdict is made.
See Nielson v. Kurz Co., 295 F.2d 692 .(2d Cir. 1961).
119. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963).
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sists, -in criminal cases at least, in not just examining the quantity of
the evidence but also in evaluating its quality by resolving questions
of credibility. In Dorsey v. United States,120 defendant had been convicted of assaulting, raping, and robbing a woman whom he had
picked up on a Washington Street. The District of Columbia Circuit
held -without discussion that there was sufficient evidence to support
convictions for assault and robbery but not for rape despite the fact
that all three charges sprung from the same incident and were based
solely'on the testimony of the prosecutrix. The reversal for the rape
conviction reflected the District of Columbia Circuit's disbelief in
her stoiy-presumably on the perhaps questionable theory that prostitutes are not raped.121
Similarly, in Wilson v. United States,"22 the District of Columbia
Circuit threw out the conviction of the defendant in an indecent
liberties case on the ground that the uncorroborated testimony of the
child-prosecutrix was insufficient to sustain a conviction. 123 The "prostitute testimony" and "uncorroborated testimony" corollaries to the
''sufficiency of the evidence test" gave the Circuit the opportunity
to review directly. the jury's resolution of credibility-power which
is not granted to it under the "sufficiency of the evidence" test.
C.

Atmospheric Regulations

Perhaps the most significant, though; infrequently employed jury
control devices are a series of rules, some with constitutional implications, which control the atmosphere in which the trial is conducted
and regulate the activities of attorneys, prosecutors and judges. These
rules are designed to protect the jury from the influence of the other
participants at the trial. They insure that the jury conducts its deliberations in a calm atmosphere, free from popular prejudices, and
that it decides the case on the basis of the evidence in the record
and not on the basis of extraneous material which often would have
120.

281 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

121.

Juries are normally more reluctant than trial judges to convict in such cases,

partly because they do not believe the complainants, but mainly because they feel that
the complainant was responsible for the situation. See KALVEN & ZEIsEL, supra note 5, at
249-54.
,
122. 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
123. Both juries and trial judges are often loath, to convict in such situations because
of the likelihood that complainant's testimony is not true. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note
5, at 170.
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been inadmissible had either party sought to introduce it into evi124
dence.
Like the evidentiary rules, the rules regulating the conduct of attorneys (especially prosecutors) and judges are manipulated to enable
the circuit courts to review the end result of the fact-finding process as
well as the mechanics of the process. Unlike the evidentiary rules,
however, the atmospheric regulations are generally manipulated in
one way only. Their application may be distorted to ignore abuses, to
uphold the verdict of the lower court, but never to invent abuses to
reverse the verdict of the lower court. 12 5 The reason for this lies in the
fact that the United States attorneys and district judges are kith and
kin of the circuit judges, many of whom have served in one or both
124. The purpose of the jury control is to permit the jury to decide those issues in
a case which are deemed suitable for a jury's deliberation under the law; to decide such
issues based solely on evidence which the law considers relevant and trustworthy; and
to decide the issues in an atmosphere which is conducive to calm and deliberate decision
making. One could say with little exaggeration that the purpose of newspaper coverage
of criminal trials is to permit the public to decide whatever issues in a case it pleases
based on whatever information the press cares to give it in an emotional and unjudicial
fashion. Naturally, this leads to a confrontation. To avoid polluting the jury, prospective
jurors are questioned about their knowledge of the case from the news media; those
affected by such knowledge are excused. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963),
where the Supreme Court ruled in effect that pretrial publicity could prejudice jurors
who had no direct contact with it. During the case, the jury is instructed to ignore any
portion of the news media which dealt with the case; in highly publicized cases, the
jurors are often sequestered for the duration of the trial. As long as the jurors do not
come into contact with such articles, they cannot be prejudiced by them although it may
still be the better part of valor for a trial judge to refrain from discussing the case
with the press. See United States v. Fancher, 319 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963). Moreover,
contact with non-prejudicial publicity is also considered harmless. See United States
v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961). Despite these precautions, however, sometimes
jurors come into contact with prejudicial news media accounts which relate to the case.
The normal method used by the trial judge in such a situation is to issue a cautionary
instruction to cure the error which occurs. Sometimes the cautionary instruction is
considered "curative" when the newspaper item is not particularly prejudicial. See
United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1963); Shepard v. United States, 281 F.2d
603 (D.C. Cir. 1960). When the material in question is excessively prejudicial, courts
have ruled that the curative instruction is insufficient. See United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1961); Coppedge, v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
125. Not surprisingly, the District of Columbia Circuit is sometimes an exception to
this rule. Eg., Berton v. United States, 259 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (reversed also on
evidentiary grounds), where the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc held that
prosecutorial claim that flight of defendant in a murder case and his disappearance for
five years prevented the government from producing most of the witnesses to the event
was unwarranted. Judges Bastian and Miller dissented on this point. Eg., Polisnik v.
United States, 259 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where the District of Columbia Circuit invoked
the "plain error" rule to reverse for an unintentional statement on the part of the trial
judge in summarizing psychiatric evidence even though the judge issued the normal cautionary instruction to the jury. Eg., Frank v. United States, 262 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
where evidence clearly indicated defendant had failed' to register as an agent for a
foreign country (the Dominican Republic) but where Judges Edgerton and Danaher conduded that prosecutor's references to defendant's involvement in the famous Murphy
case and evidence of the same, although relevant, were unnecessary and prejudicial. Judge
Prettyman dissented.
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of these capacities before elevation to the bench. Indeed, certain
manipulation of the atmospheric regulations regarding judicial conduct seems less traceable to the circuit courts' desire to uphold a
verdict it agrees with than to its desire not to criticize the conduct of
the district judge.
1. Conduct of Attorneys
Traditionally, the private attorney has been given a great deal of
leeway in his conduct during the trial. Trial courts are generally
reluctant to infringe upon the attorney's traditional, though not unlimited, privilege in this area. 26 Appellate courts are most unwilling to
reverse cases on the groud that misconduct of an attorney necessitated
a new trial. Indeed, in the course of this survey, not one case was
12 7
found where there was a reversal for misconduct of an attorney.
Perhaps the lenient attitude of the courts to an overly emotional argument by attorneys is generally justified, particularly since juries listen
to their arguments with some skepticism. Nevertheless, on occasion,
such leniency is carried too far. In Camina v. Carolina Freight Carriers,128 the defendant's attorney claimed in his summation that
plaintiff, his attorney, and his medical witnesses had all engaged in
a conspiracy to obstruct justice and falsify testimony. The Second
Circuit refused to reverse for what it admitted to be misconduct on
the ground that the plaintiff's counsel had also been emotional in
his summation. The circuit courts are equally lenient in regard to
mistatements of fact. Insignificant mistatements of fact or law in the
course of summation are probably cured by issuance of the usual
instruction that statements of counsel are not evidence and are not
to be considered as such, and that the judge rather than counsel is the
source of the law. More significant mistatements may be corrected by
specific instruction. 129 Such is not always the case with some statements
which contain inadmissible evidence.
126. see ABA CANONS OF PROFM$$IONAL ETHics No. 15, which provides, "It is improper for a lawyer to assert his personal belief in his client's innocence or in the
justice of his cause."
127. In Hong Sai Chee v. Long Island R.R., 328 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second
Circuit held harmless error an effort by defense attorney to appeal to religious prejudice
on the grounds that plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case; otherwise, the court
stated reversal would have been ordered. In actuality, the circuit courts are not often
confronted with claims of misconduct on the part of ordinary attorneys. The absence of

claims probably reflects the feeling by most attorneys that extravagant arguments by
their opponents do not furnish a strong basis for appeal.
128.
129.

297 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1962).
Dindo v. Grand Union Co., 331 F.2d 138 (Rd Cir. 1964).
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In Rofrano v. Duffy, 130 plaintiff's attorney, in both his opening
and in his closing, mentioned matters which were inadmissible into
evidence because of the hearsay rule. Despite the fact that questions
to the judge (which resulted in the issuance of a curative instruction)
indicated that the jury was considering the remarks of the plaintiff's
attorney as evidence, the Second Circuit, invoking the waiver doctrine
and the "cured error" doctrine, refused to reverse. The District of
Columbia Circuit employed the same fictions in affirming District of
Columbia v. Elliott,' 31 although plaintiff's attorney in his summation
had twice referred to matters which the trial court had refused to admit
into evidence.
In Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 32 the plaintiff, a prominent
nuclear scientist and a man of generally, extreme liberal views, had
filed suit for libel against- a newspaper which had alleged in effect
that he was pro-Communist. During the course of the trial, attorney
for the defendant referred to one of plaintiff's counsel, a member of
the Yale Law School Faculty, as "Tommie the' Commie." Under the
circumstances of that case and the prevailing political attitude of the
day, this completely irrelevant allegation probably prejudiced the
jury. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit refused to reverse.
2. Conduct of the Prosecutor
The problem of prosecutorial misconduct assumes several dimensions not present in the case of misconduct by an, ordinary attorney.
First, the prosecutor is an officer of the state. Therefore, his misconduct
reflects not just on himself but on the state. Second, this misconduct
is more likely to prejudice the rights of the 'opposing party than misconduct on the part of a private attorney. 33 Consequently, the courts
cannot justifiably give the prosecutor the same freedom given to the
ordinary attorney.
Probably the area in which the courts give the prosecutor the most
allowance is in the field of the argument to the jury. This is illustrated
in United States v. Lefkowitz.134 Here, discrediting defendant's character witness, the prosecutor informed the jury:
There is another side to Mr. Lefkowitz's character, another side
130.
131.
132.

291 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961) (evidence dearly in favor of plaintiff as jury found).
262 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (jury verdict for plaintiff seems justifiable).
335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (evidence favors defendant as jury found).

133. NAT'L COMM. ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAw ENFORCEMENT (1931).

134.
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that Mr. Heller does not know; another side that lives on the
periphery of the law;, another side that is a parasite which lives on
the unjust earnings Of others while maintaining the dignified cloak
.of a civilized human being in society. . ...
35
The Second Circuit, while characterizing this comment as "needlessly colorful," 136 did not seem overly concerned about the matter.
However, the Second Circuit does recognize that even in argument,
the prosecutor must observe.certain bounds: "It is the prosecutor's obligation to avoid arguments . . . which are immaterial and which may
serve only to prejudice the defendant. It is his duty above all else to be
fair and objective and keep his argument within the issues of the
case."137
.Despite these strictures, the courts are most reluctant to reverse
for abuse of argument and use the same devices to avoid such reversal as those used for evidentiary errors. In United States v. Passero,138
a narcotics case, the prosecutor informed the jury: "If you don't believe the agents, you may just as well clear the book on the prosecution
of narcotics." The Second Circuit ruled: "Any possibly harmful effect
of this comment, which was made -inresponse to a sharp attack upon
the agents' credibility, was cured by the judge who termed the remark
'inaccurate and improper' and instructed the jury to completely ignore
and disregard it."''13
The courts are particularly apt to invoke the "harmless error"
rule
when confronted with a claim that the prosecutor went too far in
argument. In determining :whether his remarks were harmless error,
the Second Circuit applies its special rule and will affirm a verdict
in spite of such misconduct if ". .. the jury had adequate affirmative
"..",14o Surprisingly enough, the
testimony to support its verdict.
District of Columbia Circuit, -which employed the normal "harmless
error" test in dealing with allegations of evidentiary errors, neverthe135. Id. at 314.
136. Id. For other examples of permissible oratory, see United States v. Passero, 290
F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant obviously guilty), where prosecutor argued that
defendant in narcotics case had consorted with other narcotics pushers:
In response to the defense argument that the government was improperly relying
on guilt by association, the prosecutor argued that 'when you walk like a duck, talk
like a duck, and you look like a duck, you are a duck.' Although the image may not
have been particularly apt, the remarks were in no way improper and indeed focused
the jury's -attention upon the evidence that tended to show Passero's guilt.
137. United States v. Bugros, 304 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
138. 290 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1961).
139. Id. at 245-46.
140. United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 334 (2d Cir. 1964).
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less seems to employ a version of the Second Circuit test in dealing
with allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. The District of Columbia
Circuit has said: "It is generally held that whether improper misconduct of Government counsel constitutes prejudicial error depends in
good part on the relative strength of the Government's evidence of
14
guilt." 1

In United States v. Whiting,142 the defendants were accused of a
mail fraud scheme which involved bribery of Latin American officials. In summation the prosecution alluded to such bribery and said
that if that's the way Americans do business in Latin American
countries, it was little wonder that there was anti-American rioting
in the streets down there. The Second Circuit invoked the "harmless
error" doctrine to rule, "While we are not to be understood as sanctioning such latitudinous remarks, we do not believe that they were
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal."' 143 Similarly, in United
4 4 the Second Circuit said: "While we believe the
States v. Guidarelli,1
prosecutor did overstep the bounds in summation---calling defendant
a leech and accusing him of ruining a young law student-relative's
career by having the boy hold cash for him-we do not feel that these
45
comments were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.'1
The courts are particularly fond of invoking the "waived error"
doctrine when confronted with claims of extravagant prosecutorial
argument. They justify their use of the device not only on the ground
of expediency, but also on the ground that failure of defense counsel
to make objection at trial indicates his judgment that the conduct of
which he now complains was not prejudicial. 146 The circuit courts seem
quite unwilling to invoke the "plain error" rule to reach waived
misconduct. 47 In Accardo v. United States, 48 the District of Columbia
Circuit refused to invoke the "plain error" rule despite the fact that
141. Jones v. United States, 338 F.2d 553, 554 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
142. 308 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962) (evidence ample to support the judgment).
143. Id. at 542.
144. 318 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1963) (guilt very clear).
145. Id. at 525.
146. See United States v. Farley, 292 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1961). "We do not think any
reversible error was committed in this isolated reference. The defense counsel made no
objection, and did not think the matter of sufficient moment to justify a request for a
charge on the subject." Id. at 793.
147. See United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Mont,
306 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Frascone, 299 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1962); United
States v. Farley, 292 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1961); Cecil v. United States, 254 F.2d 773 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Cook v. United States, 251 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For an exception, see
United States v. Persico, 305 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962).
148. 249 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (no doubt of guilt).
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the prosecutor, in urging the jury to believe the word of the prosecution witness (though his testimony was uncorroborated and, indeed,
contradicted by defendant), declared: ". . . if you take that position [of
believing defendant] you are issuing a license to the robbers and criminals in this jurisdiction to take over the capital of the nation ....
If so why you just issue a license, as I stated before, to increase crime
in this jurisdiction."' 49 Often, the courts simply ignore claims of improper argument. 150
Unfortunately, the courts are not inclined to look with any more
of a jaundiced eye at more serious kinds of prosecutorial misconductprosecutorial misstatements of fact and law, and prosecutorial references to matters inadmissible into evidence. 15 i Of course, if the misconduct is minor, the courts should invoke the "harmless error" rule.
However, if the misconduct is significant, it would seem that reversal
would be merited. In United States v. Dardi, 162 the Second Circuit
invoked the "harmless error" rule when the prosecutor informed the
jury of the supposed content of testimony of unavailable witnesses.
In cases involving prosecutorial misconduct of this nature, the courts
tend to rely heavily on the "cured error" doctrine. Sometimes, the circuit courts are justified in holding that the normal instruction given by
the judge to the effect that the statements of counsel are not evidence
may be sufficient to cure any misstatements made by the prosecutor.
Occasionally, a more specific instruction may also be sufficient. The
problem occurs, however, when such instructions would not seem to
be sufficient. This is a problem, however, which does not seem to be
readily recognized by the courts. In United States v. Klein, 53 the
prosecutor, in his summation, misstated a crucial item of evidence.
The trial judge, instead of correcting him, repeated the same statement twice. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that the trial judge's
general charge to the jury (which included customary instructions
not to take either judge's or prosecutor's comments as evidence) cured
149. Id. at 521-22.
150. See United States v. Cording, 290 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1961); Chaifetz v. United States,
288 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
United States v. Hunt, 258 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
151. 6 J. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1807 (3d ed. 1940); Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury
with Facts Not in Evidence-the Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139
(1956); see Note, Forensic Misconduct, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954).
152. 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir 1964) (jury had adequate affirmative testimony" to support

its verdict).
153. 306 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1962) (ample evidence to sustain Klein's participation in the
crime).
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the error in question. 5 4 In Kornegay v. United States,15 5 a prosecution
for a federal gambling law violation, the prosecutor informed the jury
that the defendant was the "backer" of a particular numbers operation. 156 The District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial judge's
instruction to disregard this remark had the effect of erasing the
impression made on the jury.:
It is interesting to note that in the period covered by this study,
the circuit courts reversed only five cases for prosecutorial miscon57
duct.1
3. Judicial Misconduct
Perhaps even more significant than misconduct on the part of the
attorneys in a civil case or the prosecutor in a criminal case, is misconduct on the part of the trial judge. Misconduct on the part of one
who ig theoretically impartial is more likely to be resented
than the
misconduct of one who is an adversary. Judicial misconduct is more
likely to cause substantial injustice to the parties than any other kind
of misconduct. The jury is far more likely to be swayed by the judge,
to whom it looks for impartial guidance, than by the parties, who it
recognizes have a definite bias. The conduct of a trial judge, like the
conduct of Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion; and the reviewing
court must be as zealous of the honor of the trial court as it is of
its own.
Unfortunately, judicial misconduct is far more difficult to detect
than prosecutorial misconduct because it seldom takes the direct form
of extravagant and emotional argument or the shape of inadmissible
evidence. Generally,.it consists of a course of. conduct which conveys
the impression of bias for one side or another. 1 8 Often; no single
incident may be significant. 159 Moreover, the conduct which is preju154. . Id. at 15,
155. 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (guilt clear).
156. Record at 498, id.
157. See United States v. Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1964) (reversed also for lack
of counsel); United States v. Persico, 305 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962) (reversed also for judicial
misconduct); United States v. Bugros, 304 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1962); Frank v. United States,
262 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Belton v. United States, 259 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(reversed in part on evidence, part for prosecittorial misconduct).
158. Sometimes the misconduct of the judge may lead to the introduction of inadmissible evidence. See -Brief for Appellant at 6, McNamara v. Dionne, 298 F.2d 352
(2d Cir. 1962) (Clark, J., dissenting), where Judge Gibson in a negligence case permitted
defendant's lawyer to enter a special appearance in the case although the defendant. was
represented by counsel furnished by his insurer, and where trial judge permitted defendant's lawyer to argue about charge insofar as it related to insurance in front of the
jury (clear case. on liability but amount of damages questionable).
159. See United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
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dicial often differs only in degree from that which is non-prejudicial.
Frequently, the conduct complained of is but a slightly exaggerated
version of the normal conduct of certain trial judges who have in time
lost their psychological fitness for the bench. Well aware that certain
judges are frequent offenders in.this regard, the circuit courts are'all
too often willing to tolerate almost incredible conduct on the part of a
judge which would not be tolerated in any one else. Attorneys would
be jailed for conduct which trial judges are permitted to engage in,
not only without rebuke from circuit courts but even without notice.
Although the printed record is often inadequate to convey the atmosphere of a trial, a number of cases encountered in this survey
seemed to exhibit examples of judicial misconduct which are shocking
in nature.
The circuit courts, however, are not easily shocked. In United States
v. Williams,6 0 for example, Judge Bicks struggled with counsel for
one of the defendants throughout the trial, constantly harassing him
and hampering his cross-examination, of witnesses. While some ,of. the
difficulty was probably due to the counsel's fault,: some of it seemed
to be a result of Judge Bicks' evident desire to teach the attorney a
lesson. Indeed, Judge Bicks' attitude even spread over to the attorney
for the second defendant. On asking the counsel if he had ample
opportunity to cross 'examine, the counsel replied, "I don't know,
Judge. I'll have to sleep on it and think it over." Judge Bicks then
commented, "You'd better start sleeping now, while the jury and the
witnesses are here."'161 Judge Bicks was so significantly cognizant of the
extent to which the trial had become a personal quarrel 'between 'the
defense counsel and himself that he felt obliged'to issue cautionary
instructions to the jury telling them not to be influenced by his rebuke
of defense -counsel.1 2 The Second Circuit, affirming this case in open
court without opinion, completely ignored the problem caused by
Judge Bicks' misconduct. In United States v. Gross,'0 Judge Bicks
interrupted the prosecutor's examination of the main defense witness
to predict to the jury that, "Give the United States Attorney an opportunity and I daresay there must be a prior contradictory statement
which he [the witness] is now going to be confronted with."''
At this
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

282 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960) (guilt clear from the record).
Record at 338, id.
Brief for Appellee at 48, id.
286 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1961) (evidence of guilt dear).
Id. Joint Appendix, at 1439.
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point, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial judge denied
his motion but told the jury to disregard his comment. "If my surmise was a wrong one, the jury has been instructed adequately.' 165
The Second Circuit again ignored this misconduct on the part of
Judge Bicks in its affirmation of the conviction in this case. 166 In
United States v. Ramis,'67 the Second Circuit refused to examine as
unworthy of "discussion" a complaint of misconduct arising from the
fact that Judge Cooper had interrupted the summation of defense
counsel three times in an attempt to get him to abide by a supposed
agreement to speak only half an hour, and the allegation that Judge
Cooper had made various prejudicial facial expressions while giving
the charge. 168
Sometimes the "ostrich" approach is employed when the circuit
courts reverse on other grounds. Thus, the Second Circuit did not
discuss the misconduct of Judge Zavatts in United States v. Paroutian,169
which it reversed for failure to suppress illegally seized evidence, even
though the trial judge had prejudicially referred to the defendant as
"this operator, co-conspirator," "this big operator," and "this big
70
shot."'
The Second Circuit is particularly adept at employing its test for
harmless error to rule that the complained-of conduct on the part of
the trial judge was not prejudicial.' 7 ' Occasionally, the Second Circuit
165. Id.
166. This action by the Second Circuit is particularly incomprehensible because Judge
Bicks had a long history of judicial misconduct. The Second Circuit had rebuked him
for his actions in United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1960), and in Wendy v.
McLean Trucking Co., 279 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1960). It was obvious that to charge Judge
Bicks' method of trying cases would require reversals of his actions and not mere rebukes,
or worse yet, a hear, say and see no evil attitude.
167. 315 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1963) (evidence of guilt clear).
168. Admittedly, It is somewhat difficult for an appellate court to examine this claim
of error. See McElroy, Some Observations Concerning the Discretion Reposed in the
Trial Judge by ALI's Code of Evidence, MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN E 250 (1942).
169. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
170. Record at 1936-37, id.
171. It expostulated this test in United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961),
where it said:
The serious question . . . is whether reversal is required because of the remarks by
the judge. . . . If the incidents were to be considered alone, as they appear when
assembled in some seventy typewritten pages to appendix to appellants' briefs we
should deem it our duty to reverse, as our colleagues in the First Circuit have
recently done . . . . Moreover, this was not a case where there was a strong factual
issue . . . defendants had not testified and the only issue of fact was whether the
jury would believe prosecution witnesses whose testimony had not been challenged
in any effective way. Under the circumstances, we do not believe reversal to be
required.
Id. at 459-60.
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is justified in so doing. 172 As mentioned before, Paulingv. News Syndicate Co.,178 however, is not one of those instances. This case involved
an action for libel brought by Dr. Linus Pauling. Judge Dawson permitted defendant's attorney to refer to one of plaintiff attorneys as
"Tommie the Commie." After plaintiff had testified, "The editors of
a great newspaper have a special obligation to stick to the truth,"
Judge Dawson broke in to say, "But you don't think you do." Judge
Dawson also informed the jury that plaintiff was "foolish to have views
on the Constitution."1 7 4 Confronted with a clear cut case of judicial
misconduct, the Second Circuit declared:
We have given careful consideration to the claim of unfairness
on the part of the trial judge. It is difficult for an appellate court
to appraise the significance of remarks that may look quite different in a cold record than when made in the give and take of a
trial. Although some comments would better have been foregone,
the record is far from manifesting such unfairness as to warrant
our ordering a new trial after
a balanced charge and an afternoon's
75
deliberation by the jury.
The Second Circuit equalled its obtuse performance in this case
with its decision in United States v. Frascone.78 There, Judge Noonan,
behaved improperly throughout the entire course of the trial. In the
day and a half consumed by the prosecution's case, he intervened 133
times to ask the witnesses further questions to strengthen the prosecution's case. At the same time, he constantly interfered with defense counsel's cross-examination of these witnesses by interrupting
defense counsel some thirty times. At one point, when defense counsel
was asking a government agent how he had met a certain informer,
Judge Noonan intervened to say, "Mr Burns, I assume that Mr. McDonnell did not meet Mr. Bove as a fellow student at Oxford University."1 77 When defense counsel was questioning the agent about the
number of payments he had made to this informer, Judge Noonan
172. United States v. Fanchers, 319 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963) (comments made out of
presence of jury to newspaper reporters. Jurors do not read newspaper reports); United
States v. Tomaiolo, 317 F.2d F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1963) (comments made to jury after
verdict Is returned); Riggs v. Lilibridge, 316 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1965) (limited questioning
of witness by trial judge); United States v. Campisi, 292 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1961) (trial
judge strict with both sides in regards to expedition of trial).
173. 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964). See text, section III(c)(1) supra.
174. Record at 303, 280, 296-97, 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).
175. 335 F.2d at 671.
176. 299 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1962). Second Circuit made reference to "impressive
evidence" against defendant. Id. at 828.
177. Brief for Appellant at 17-24, id.
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again intervened to state (incorrectly) that his testimony on direct
examination had been "that he doesn't recall any.' 178 When defense
counsel asked another witness how long a given conversation had
lasted, Judge Noonan again intervened to say, "Well, I think the
conversation lasted no more than-thirty seconds. Do you?"' 79 At another
time when defense counsel was making a point that persons delivering
narcotics resembled grocery boys, Judge Noonan remarked, apropos
of nothing, "Well, I delivered groceries when I was in grammar school
and are you putting me in a similar category."'8 s0 The Second Circuit's
response to this display of judicial misconduct was quite simple.
"Although one or two of his comments would have been better unsaid,
the record does not reveal that the judge's remarks obstructed defense
in its effort to present evidence.'"""
Another device used by the Second Circuit to, avoid reversals for
judicial misconduct is the "waiver" doctrine. In Blue v. Pennsylvania
Railroad,82 an accident case in which plaintiff had injured her finger,
Judge Ritter engaged in the following colloquies with defense counsel:
The Court: Did she lose her finger in this accident?
Mr. Gitlin: She cut her finger.
.
The court: It looks to me as if she got a finger off.
Q. Did you lose your finger?
A. No. I mashed that.
The Court: I see. She had-it folded over.'That has been'bent all
during the trial. The way it was bent, I thought it was cut off,;
yesterday. She has trouble with her little finger, bad trouble.
Mr. Gitlin: Your Honor, we have taken testimony of the two doctots, who are not subject to subpoena by this court.
The Court: We are not going to listen to all that. What do you
need all that for?
Mr. Gitlin: May I read parts of it?
The Court: Yes. I do not see why we cannot have some stipulations about some of these things. The woman was hurt. There
isn't any question about that. She was hurt bad. Is there any question in your mind about what happened to this woman?
Mr. Kenny: May counsel approach the bench, your Honor?
The Court: Yes. Is there any question at all in your mind about
what happened to this woman?
178.
179.

Id.
Id.

180.

Id.

181.
182.

299 F.2d at 829. See United States v. Birnbaum, 37 F.2d 490, 498 (2d Cir. 1964).
301 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Mr. Kenny: Yes,.there is, your18Honor.
3
The Court: I don't know why.
Unfortunately, the defense counsel did not make any objection
during several of these colloquies. The Second Circuit, invoking the
"waiver" doctrine, the "harmless error" rule, and the "cured error"
rule, affirmed the decision. In general, however, the Second Circuit has
been willing to relax the rigor of the "waiver" doctrine in criminal
84
cases by the invocation of the "plain error" rule.
A final device used by the Second Circuit to avoid reversals for
judicial misconduct is the "cured error" doctrine. Under some circumstances, where the trial judge's demonstration of bias has not been
significant, an instruction on his part to disregard any such demonstra85
tion may be sufficient to erase the matter from the minds of the jury.
If, .however, his bias has. been blatant, a curative instruction would
seem, to be unavailing.8 6 The Second Circuit is normally justified
in invoking this doctrine in cases in which the trial judge in the course
of summing up the evidence has-made a minor mistake and corrects
it by a general instruction to the jury not to take his summary as
evidence but.only as his recollection of the evidence. 187 If, however,
the mistake is a significant one, or if the trial judge goes too far in
resolving jury questions in the summary, it would seem that the curative instruction would be inadaquate. Nevertheless, in United States v.
Klein, 8 8 when the trial judge mistook a crucial item of evidence in
his summation, the Second Circuit ruled that the normal instruction
regarding summation was sufficient to erase the impact of the judge's
remark from the minds of the jury.8 9 It is interesting to note that in
the peri6d .covered by the survey, the Second Circuit reversed only
two cases-solely for judicial misconduct. 9 0 '
183. -Record at 38-39, 199, id.
184. See United States v. Salazar, 293 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961).
185. See United States v. Haskell, 327 F.2d 281. (2d Cir. 1964);. United States v.
Woodner, 317 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1963).
186. See United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833, 835 '(2d Cir. 1961) (defendant's guilt
clear and Second Circuit- affirmed results.of retrial, 329 F.2d 929 (1964)).
187. United States v. Haynes, 291 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1961).
188.
189.

306 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1962).,,
Id. at 15.

190.

United States v. Salazar, 293 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961) (evidence of guilt dear);

United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961). In two other cases, the Second
Circuit reversed both for judicial misconduct and for other errors. See United States v.
Persico, 305 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962); Rheaume v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1961)
(weak case for plaintiff-appellee). In at least nine other cases the Second Circuit noted
misconduct on the part of the trial court, rebuked it, but refused to reverse. See United

States v. Bimbaum, 337 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1964); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d
659 (1964); United States v. Haskell,' 327 F.2d 281 (2d Cir: 1964); United States v.
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In contrast to the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit
seems to have no problem with the kind of judicial misconduct seemingly common in the Second Circuit. However, the District of Columbia
Circuit is willing to use the "harmless error" test to justify judicial misconduct. In United States v. Lyles,19 defendant, accused of murder, invoked the insanity defense. At the end of the trial, the trial judge
instructed the jury as to the effects of a verdict of acquittal by reason of
insanity. After carefully informing the jury that defendant, if acquitted
on this ground, would be confined to a mental hospital from which he
would be released when recovered, the trial judge reminded the jury
that a psychiatrist had already found the defendant competent to stand
trial. The majority of the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en
banc, ignoring the fact that any alert juryman would have instantly
noted the import of the judge's remarks, concluded that they constituted harmless error in view of the fact that this remark was but a
192
minor element in a lengthy but otherwise valid charge and summary.
In United States v. Heinke, 93 the District of Columbia Circuit wrongfully invoked the "cured error" doctrine to affirm a case in which the
trial judge had given the jury his opinion on one of the ultimate issues
in the case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The study of the circuit courts' regulation of the fact-finding process
by means of the jury control devices tends to substantiate two hypotheses about these devices. First, it seems evident that the circuit courts
do not concern themselves with such devices when reviewing the factfinding process conducted by a trial judge sitting without a juryexcept to the extent that the circuit courts employ the "sufficiency of
the evidence" test in criminal trials. Second, it seems clear that the
circuit courts also manipulate the use of these devices when reviewing
the fact-finding process conducted by a jury so as to review not just the
process, but the end results of the process. At this point, however, it
Fancher, 319 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Tomalolo, 317 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Frascone,
299 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961); Wendy
v. McLean Trucking Co., 279 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Curcio, 279
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1960).
191. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Edgerton, Bazelon, Fahy & Washington, JJ., dissenting).
192. Id. at 730.
193. 294 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (evidence of guilt dear) (judge gave usual cautionary
instructions about his comments and comments of counsel).
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would be well to recognize that the above study permits us to make
no conclusions regarding the use of these control devices at the trial
level because the cases appealed constitute a small proportion of the
cases actually tried. Indeed, the cases appealed presumably show a
much higher rate of non-application, or mal-application, of the control devices than the vast majority of the cases which are not appealed.
Thus, there may be no inconsistency between observing that these
control devices are treated cavalierly at the appellate level, and suspecting that this treatment may be a result in part of the circuit
courts conviction that they are generally applied quite properly at
the trial level (and consequently that any misapplication of them is
likely to involve a close question and was probably not prejudicial to
the appellant).
This last point can best be understood by an examination of Tables
V, VI, VII, VIII and IX.19 Table V19 5 shows seven cases in which the
circuit courts misapplied the rules of evidence or the atmospheric
regulations to justify reversal of jury verdicts of which they disap97
6
proved. In Polisnik v. United States'9 and Edmonds v. United States,'
there was substantial evidence to indicate that the defendants were
insane and the reversals in these cases probably reflected the District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the jury verdicts of guilty
9 s United States v.
were not justified. In United States v. Belton,1
° the District of Columbia
Fenwick, 9 9 and United States v. Taylor2O
Circuit seemed to feel that the evidence of guilt was weak. In Belton
it was because the only prosecution witness had repudiated his earlier
story and now supported the defendant's claim of self-defense; in
Fenwick it was because the prosecution witnesses were accomplices
with good reason to be antagonistic to the defendant; in Taylor it was
because with the exception of one statement by a co-defendant, which
the jury was instructed not to use against Taylor, there was little
convincing evidence against Taylor. In Evans, the District of Columbia
Circuit seemed to be quite disturbed by the fact that there was no
motive for the homicide and seems to have concluded that evidence
of the decedent's serious mental problems, while not substantiating
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See
Id.
259
260
259
252
260

Tables V, VI, VII, VIII & IX in Appendix infra.
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

951
474
811
124
737

(D.C.
(D.C.
(D.C.
(D.C.
(D.C.

Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.

1958).
1958).
1958).
1958).
1958).
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defendant's claim of self-defense (in an attempt to repel rape) might
still have convinced the jury that the decedent probably did initiate the
dispute. The District of Columbia Circuit's reversal of the multi-count
conviction in Dancy may reflect its dislike of police undercover narcotics
agents and its conviction that the police bother the small-time casual
pusher .but not the "big man." In all events, the reversals of the cases
listed in. Table V reflect the circuit courts' reaction to the "error" in
the verdict rather than the "error" in the use of the control devices.
20 2
Table V1201 shows the cases in which the circuit courts misapplied
the rules of.evidence and the rules controlling atmospheric regulations
to justify affirmance of jury verdicts with which they agreed. In ten
of the twelve civil cases listed, the. evidence as examined and commented upon by the circuit court, or in the absence of such examination, as evaluated by the author, seemed to support the verdict. In
Levis v. Chapman,203 the author feels that there was strong evidence
of contributory negligence but that the small jury verdict made allowance for this. In McNamara v. Dionne,204 the author believes the
damages awarded by the jury seemed excessive. In twenty-two of the
twenty-three criminal cases listed, the evidence seemed to support the
jury's verdict. In United States v. Lyles,20 5 the sanity question seemed
close to the- author and may be partly responsible for the -dissents by
four members of the. District of Columbia Circuit.
Table _VII 20 6 lists a number of cases in which the circuit courts
properly reversed jury verdicts because certain evidence had been
improperly- kept from the jury. In United States v. 18.43 Acres of
207 a condemnation case, the-jury had not been given evidence
.Land,
of.'prices. paid for similar tracts of land nor evidence showing the
amount of tax ,stamps. purchased by the plaintiff when he sold the
08
remaining -portion of land. In Abrams v. Gordon,2 the plaintiff had
been prevented from impeaching defendant's medical witnesses by
means of a treatise. In Howard v. United States209 and United States v.
201. See Table VI in Appendix infra.
202. "Misapplied" is not used in the strict sense. The author recognizes that some of
the "misapplication" might be justified under the "harmless error" or "abuse of discretion" rules.
203. 265 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
204. 298 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1962).
205. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
206. See Table VII in Appendix infra.
207. 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963).
208. 276 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
209. 278 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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Tomaillo,210 the defendants had not been permitted to introduce prior
inconsistent statements which would have had the effect of impeaching
the testimony of the main prosecution witnesses. The admission of
evidence that plaintiff was drawing a pension in Eichel v. New York
Central Railroad2 "1 would have supported defendant's contention, on
the issue of damages, that the plaintiff was malingering when he
claimed total disability. In United States v. New York Trade Zone
Operators,212 the exclusion of a report of an accident offered by plaintiff's assignee weakened a plaintiff's case which was otherwise based on
the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff and the totally ineffectual
and confused testimony of his friend. In Puggioni v. Luckenbach
Steamship .Co., 213 the plaintiff's case was adversely affected by the
court's refusal to permit him to impeach one of his witnesses with a
prior inconsistent statement. The one characteristic common to all of
these cases is the exclusion of evidence which might have led the jury
to a different verdict. Table VIII,214 on the other hand, lists a number
of cases in which the circuit courts properly reversed, jury verdicts
because.of errors in the admission of evidence or because of judicial
or prosecutorial misconduct. The one characteristic common to all of
these cases is that in the view of the circuit courts or in the view of
the author the evidence on the part of the prevailing party was very
weak. Since the caseslisted on these two tables represent fourteen of
twenty-one cases properly reversed for evidentiary error or misconduct,
it seems quite probable: (1)that the circuit courts are influenced by
their view of the verdict in cases in which they have valid grounds
for reversal, and (2) that they are generally willing to reverse only .if
the error complained of involves the admission, of prejudicial evidence
or misconduct in a case where the evidence for the prevailing side was
weak, or if the error complained of involves the exclusion of material
evidence in a case where the jury, shown the excluded evidence, might
have arrived at a different verdict. The cases :listed in these two tables
are cerainly not cases in which the circuit courts' application of the
rules of evidence and of the atmospheric regulations was made without
regard to the evidence. This is not to say, however, that there are no
such cases. Indeed, in all of the cases listed on Table IX,215 the prosecu210. 286 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1961).
211. 319 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1963).
212. 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1961).
213. 286 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1961).
214. See Table VIII in Appendix infra..
215. Id.
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tion's case was quite strong and yet the circuit court reversed. And
216
then there is the curious case of Masuda v. Kawaski Dockyard Co.,
where the Second Circuit patted itself on the back for refusing to
reverse a case in which it disapproved of the jury verdict. Exceptio
probat regulam.
While it is easy to understand how the appellate courts, impatient at
the bit of indirect review, and skeptical of the significance of the
errors complained of, tend to abandon the enforcement of the control
devices in non-jury cases and manipulate their enforcement of them in
jury trials, it is not so easy to approve of their modus operandi. Admittedly, the system seems to work relatively well in practice, because
the circuit courts are skilled in reviewing the results produced by the
jury and partly because many of the jury control devices such as a
number of the laws of evidence are unnecessary. Nevertheless, the
system as it operates at the present has two great weaknesses.
First, the Second Circuit underestimates the effect of judicial misconduct on the jury and its tendency to degrade the judicial system.
Kalven and Zeisel have already shown the great influence possessed
by trial judges in their calculations that in clear cut cases judge-jury
disagreement may range from 4 per cent to 26 per cent depending on
the degree of empathy felt by the jury to the defendant when the trial
judge neither summarizes the evidence nor comments on it.2 17 In the
same type of cases, however, when the trial judge summarizes the
evidence or comments upon it, the disagreement rate dropped to 0
per cent to I per cent.2 18 Moreover, Kalven and Zeisel have noted that
when the trial judge by his demeanor or other actions reveals his
opinion of the case, "the majority of the jurors are both interested in
and skillful in reading his reaction." 219 In view of the impact that
misconduct may have on the jury, the appellate courts cannot with any
sense of justice continue to tolerate the kind of conduct which certain
of its district judges feel free to indulge in. Although the ultimate
solution to this problem is the creation of a commission to consider
misconduct of judges and force from the bench those who can no longer
adorn it with honor, the circuit courts, when confronted with such
misconduct on appeal, must be more cognizant of the effect of such
misconduct on a jury and also more zealous for the honor of the court.
216.
217.

328 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1964).
KALvEN & ZEisEL, supra note 5, at 427.

218. Id. Admittedly, no such correlation was found in close case.
219.
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The second deficiency in the present system is far more fundamental
than the first. There is something both illogical and, in the last analysis, fundamentally dishonest about the system which has one rule
for the jury, another for the trial judge, and still a third at the appellate level; or which permits the appellate courts by manipulation of
the jury control devices to review the results of the fact-finding process
even though in theory such review is verboten. Such lack of rationality
and constancy in the operation of our judicial system has a debilitating
effect on all the participants. In the end the cost of such a performance
gap must be blanket distrust for the institution perpetuating it, and,
in the end, for society itself.
One method of bridging the performance gap would be for the
appellate courts to enforce the employment of the jury control devices
without regard to the results produced by the fact-finding process.
Indeed, such strict enforcement is clearly mandated, as indicated earlier,
in terms of the standards for judicial conduct. Nevertheless, such strict
enforcement would have several grave deficiencies.
The first deficiency is a purely practical one. Strict enforcement of
the jury control devices, carried to its logical conclusion, would involve
the jettisoning of the "harmless error" rule, the "waiver" doctrine, and
the "cured error" rule, and would result in the reversal of such a huge
number of trials as to tie the federal judicial system in knots. Even if
strict enforcement were not carried to its logical extreme, it might place
a serious burden on the judicial system.
The second deficiency seems more substantial in nature. Strict enforcement of the rules of evidence in particular would not produce
more substantial justice than that which results under the present
system. Indeed, strict enforcement might produce less substantive justice than is produced under the present system. The reason for this lies
in the weaknesses of the rules of evidence themselves.Y Let us examine
the rule against admission of evidence of prior crimes. The rationale
for this rule is that evidence of prior crimes may lead the jury to infer
that the defendant has a criminal character and thus lead the jury to
convict more readily. The factual assumption behind this theory would
seem to be accurate.22 1 However, the conclusion which is drawn from
220.

Cf. E. MORGANj PROBLEMS OF PROOF 169-95 (1956), for a searching examination of

the evidence included and excluded by the rules of evidence.
221. KALVEN & Z~asrL, supra note 5, at 121-33, indicate that 1 per cent of judge-jury
disagreement in which a jury acquits where the judge would have convicted are the
result of the judge's knowledge of defendant's record and the jury's ignorance of the
same. The reason that more disagreements are not occasioned by such factor is that 74
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the theory-that such evidence should not be given to a jury--does not
seem to make sense. However, accepting for a moment this conclusion,
the "prior crimes" rule still does not stand scrutiny. Under the rule,
evidence of prior crimes will be admissible as part of the res gestae, to
prove a conspiracy, to prove other crimes by the accused employing
the same modus operandi, to show a passion for illicit relations with
the victim of a sex crime, toshow that the criminal act was not inadvertent, to establish motive, to show malice, to pro've identity, to
constitute admissions by conduct or to impeach. 222 Although admitted
solely for the purposes set forth in the exception, evidence of prior
crimes cannot fail to have an effect on the jury's evaluation of defendant's character and its calculation of the likelihood that he committed
the crime -in question: Thus, the "prior crimes" rule will permit the
jury to use evidence of prior crimes for the very purpose which, the
rule is intended to thwart.
'The "prior crimes" rule is not the only evidentiary rule which is
inherently contradictory. Anothersuch rule is the rule that statements
of co-conspirators are admissible only if made in the course of a con22 3
spiracy. '
Strictly, the pr6secuiion should first establish prima facie the
conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evidence of
acts and declarations of each in the course of its execution are
admissible against all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a
charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the
accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may never have authorized or intended
or even known about, but which help to persuade. the jury of
existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy
often is proved by-evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that conspiracy existed. The naive, assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, all
. practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated: fiction. 224 .
Indeed, the hearsay rule in general is inherently contradictory in the
sense that it is intended to keep "hearsay" statements from being used
per cent of defendants 'with records and 90 per cent of defendants without records take
the stand (75 per cent of the time the defendant's criminal record is brought out if he
takes the stand; 13 per cent of the time when he does not take the stand it is brought
out also). See id. at 146-47. Moreover, juries tend to draw unfavorable inferences in cases
where defendant does not testify so the prior crimes rules protection of defendant's
criminal record is not as effective as it might be. Id. at 179-81.
222. J. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 157 (lst ed. 1954).
223. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
224. Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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for the truth of the matter asserted, but by permitting certain statements
to come in under the exceptions to the hearsay rule it in effect permits
these. statements to be used for the truth of the matter asserted, as the
appellants in United States v. Kennedy22 5 found out to theirfsorrow.
However, it is not the evidentiary rules themselves which seem so
illogical and contradictory in the last analysis, as it is the concept of jury
control by means of such rules. There is something inherently inconsistent and illogical about making a body of laymen the triers of fact in
a given case and then trying to hedge against their decision by censoring the information given to them. One of the most significant conclusions of the Kalven and Zeisel survey on the jury is that the jury does
understand the case and it does follow the evidence; in short, that
mistrust for the jury is unjustified. 226 If the jur is to be given the
responsibility for deciding a case, a responsibility which the jury discharges adequately, it makes no sense to keep from it the kind. of
information which the average juror receives, evaluates, and acts upon
in the course of his daily existence. There seems to be no reason in fact
or logic to assume that taking the juror off the street and placing him
in a jury box somehow renders him incompetent to deal with the kind
of information he had been dealing with the day before. Granted,
hearsay is not the best evidence. The juror knows this as well as the
judge, however, and will make proper allowance for it. In light of this,
it would be foolish to tighten the enforcement of the rules of evidence.
The third objection to the proposal to enforce the jury controls
more strictly is psychological and functional in nature. The requirement that circuit courts (or any other individual or group) review the
means by which the fact-finding process is conducted, rather than the
results of the process itself, is to ask them to go against human nature.
The deficiency of the present system is that it places what at times
becomes an irresistible temptation in front of the circuit judges. There
appears to be no way to remove this temptation. Moreover, one' is
moved to inquire as to why, ignoring history and tradition for a .moment, this temptation should be removed. Common sense suggests
that if circuit courts can review the findings of a trial judge, they should
be equally able to review the findings of a jury.
It would seem that strict enforcement of the jury control devices is
not, except in the case of judicial misconduct, the answer. If one does
225.
226.

291 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1961).
KALvEN & ZEIsEL, supra note 5, at 149.
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not bridge the performance gap by making reality conform to theory,
one can make the theory conform to the reality. What should be done
is to abandon the concept of indirect review and to permit circuit
courts to review the jury's verdict with the same attitude of respect with
which it reviews the trial judge's judgment. 227 At the same time, the
227. F. Lee Bailey, suggested that the misfortunes of Dr. Sheppard, who was convicted by a jury influenced by pretrial publicity in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966), could have been avoided if the appellate courts had the power to review directly
the jury's verdict. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1.
Of course, it should be noted that direct review as it is presently conducted in non-jury
civil cases pursuant to the "clearly erroneous" standard has certain weaknesses. The first
of these stems from the occasional refusal of trial judges to make findings of fact pursuant to FaD. R. Civ. P. 52(a). For violations of this rule, see Nuzzo v. Redieri, 304 F.2d
506 (2d Cir. 1962) (reversed); Eden v. Lauriat, 254 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (injunction)
(remanded for further findings); Van der Heyot v. Rogers, 251 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(dismissal for failure to prosecute) (remanded for further findings).
Often when the trial judge does make findings of fact, he does not prepare these
findings himself but merely copies them from a list submitted by the victorious side.
See Brief for Appellant at 34-36, Bevelheimer v. Slick Airways, Inc., 303 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1962); Wiseman v. Sinclair Refining Co., 290 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1961); Appleton Elec. Co.
v. Watson, 148 F. Supp. 69, 71 (D.D.C. 1957). The author has been informed that this
practice was common in the Second Circuit during the period covered by this study by
Ralph Winter, then Clerk for Judge Marshall and now Professor of Law, Yale University.
When findings are non-existent or inadequate, the circuit court application of the "clearly
erroneous" test is hampered because of its ignorance of what the trial judge "really" found.
Another weakness of the direct review stems from the confusion between findings of
fact (which are to be upheld unless "clearly erroneous") and conclusions of law (which
are subjected to de novo review), particularly in cases which involve mixed questions of
fact and law. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON Lw 120-29 (1861).
In Ruby v. American Airlines, 329 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1964), for example, the majority of
the Second Circuit treated the trial judge's conclusion that the employer had failed
to bargain in good faith as a finding of fact and upheld the trial judge's decision on the
grounds that it was not clearly erroneous. Judge Friendly, dissenting, argued that such
a conclusion was a conclusion of law open to full review without regard to the lower
court's ruling. The existence of a number of mixed questions of fact and law sometimes
will induce an appellate court to apply the "clearly erroneous" test to a conclusion of
law or to engage in de novo review of a finding of fact. See Romero v. Garcia, 286 F.2d
347 (2d Cir. 1961), for a discussion of whether a determination of negligence is a finding
of fact or a finding of law. "Many decisions in this Circuit, some in civil actions and
others in admiralty, have held that a judge's determination of negligence, as distinguished
from the evidentiary facts leading to it, is a conclusion of law freely reviewable on appeal
and not a finding of fact entitled to the benefit of the 'unless clearly erroneous' rule....
The basis of these decisions is that determination of negligence involves first the formulation and then the application of a standard of conduct to evidentiary facts found to be
established. When all this has been done by a judge, a reviewing court has no means of
knowing whether he formulated the standard correctly, since he does not charge himself.
Thus, there must be free review of his ultimate determination of negligence although
not of the facts on which it was based." Id. at 355. Accord, Trost v. American Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 324 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1963); see United States v. Certain Interests in Property,
302 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1962) (contract-question of law or fact); Pacific Tow Boat Co. v.
States Marine Corp., 276 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1960); Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234
F.2d 4, 10 (6th Cir. 1956).
The circuit courts are reluctant to reverse findings by a trial judge, particularly when
these findings are based on his resolutions of credibility. See United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945), where Judge Hand says that a circuit
court:

.. will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded. This is
true to a considerable degree even when the judge has not seen the witnesses. His
duty is to sift the evidence, to put it into logical sequence and to make the proper
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rules of evidence should be abolished in favor of a general rule which
makes any evidence admissible unless the trial judge specifically exinferences from it; and in the case of a record of over 40,000 pages like that before
us, it is physically impossible for an appellate court to function at all without ascribing some prima facie validity to his conclusions. . . . The reason for this is obvious
and has been repeated over and over again; in such cases, the appeal must be decided
upon an incomplete record, for the printed word is only a part, and often by no
means the most important part, of the sense impressions which we use to make up
our minds. Since an appellate court must have some affirmative reason to reverse
anything done below, to reverse a finding it must appear from what the record does
preserve that the witnesses could not have been speaking the truth, no matter
how transparently reliable and honest they could have appeared. Even upon an
issue on which there is conflicting direct testimony, appellate courts ought to be
chary before going so far; and upon an issue like the witness's own intent, as to
which he alone can testify, the finding is indeed "unassailable," except in the most
exceptional cases.
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
Such reluctance is based on the circuit courts' obeisance to demeanor evidence and to
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which provides that on appeal, "due regard shall be given to the
opportunity for the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Nevertheless, the circuit courts often seem to place too high a value on demeanor evidence.
See Blatt, He Saw, the Witnesses, 38 AM. Ju. Soc. 86 (1954), for a suggestion that demeanor
evidence is over-valued. See Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts not in Evidence
-the Fiction Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 155 n.95 (1956), for the suggestion
that appellate courts may have a better view of trial than trial judges because they have
a clearer perspective. In Mayer v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 289 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1960),
the trial judge refused to accept plaintiffs version of her medical treatment at the hands
of defendant's doctor ". . even though this was uncontradicted and an inference favorable to her might have been drawn from respondent's unexplained failure to produce the
testimony of the ship's doctor." Id. at 563. The Second Circuit, over the dissent of Judge
Clark, affirmed the trial judge's rejection of plaintiff's testimony on the grounds that he
could reasonably have found her testimony impeached by her demeanor and, consequently,
unworthy of credence. See Shortler v. Adler, 258 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958), for a contrary
rule. In this case, District of Columbia Circuit reversed trial judge for refusing to accept
uncontradicted and not inherently incredible testimony of plaintiff's witnesses.
In Salines v. Schwartz, 290 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1961), plaintiff stated that he had been driving his vehicle up First Avenue and was going through the intersection under a green
light when he was hit by defendant's car. He admitted, however, that he had been trying
to make every light on First Avenue on the way uptown. Defendant claimed that the
light was green when he crossed First Avenue and struck the plaintiff's automobile. The
only other witness to the case, a man who had been driving behind the plaintiff, testified
that he had told passengers in his car that plaintiff was heading for trouble the way he
was driving. He then testified that plaintiff had run the red light at this intersection.
The trial judge nevertheless rejected the testimony of defendant and the impartial witness
and accepted testimony of plaintiff. The Second Circuit upheld his decision partly on
the grounds that he had opportunity to observe the witnesses. In Sittler v. United States,
316 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1963), a naturalization case, the trial judge refused to accept petitioner's avowal of devotion to American principles and his disavowal of any devotion to the
principles of German Nationalism and National Socialism which had led him at the age
of twenty to enter Germany, become a German citizen, join the Nazi party, and work for
the Nazi propaganda agency. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial judge's rejection of
plaintiff's testimony and the testimony of twenty character witnesses who appeared on his
behalf because of the ". . . opportunity of the district judge to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses, particularly of the petitioner himself." Id. at 314.
The reluctance of the circuit courts to employ the "clearly erroneous" test to overturn
a trial judge's findings of fact may be best evidenced by the fact that during the period
covered by this survey, the Second Circuit overturned the trial judge's decision in five
cases on this ground while the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the trial judge's
decision in only one case. See Damanti v. Inger, 314 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1963); Nuzzo v.
Rederi, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962); Kalimian v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 300 F.2d 547 (2d
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'as excessively prejudicial, too time-consuming, or lacking in
cludes it
probity.
Cir. 1962); James Wood Trading Establishment v. Jaques Coe, 297 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.
1961); Wiseman v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 290 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1961); Shortler v. Adler, 258
F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
APPENDIX

TABLE I
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR' THE

DIsTrscr

OF COLUMBIA

Civil Cases
Jury

Judge Only
Affirmed
Reversed on Findings or
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Reversed for Evidentiary Errors
Reversed for Judicial Misconduct
Reversed on Instructions or
Conclusions of Law

6.

.

23
12
1
01

0
7

2
38

Total

1
0
0

TABLE II
'UNITED STATES COURT OF-APPEALS FOR THE

DIsTRCT

OF COLUMBIA

Criminal Cases
Judge Only.

Totil

Jury
58

1

Affirmed
Reversed on Findings or
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Reversed for Evidentiary Errors
Reversed for Prosecutorial Misconduct
Reversed on Judicial Misconduct
Reversed on Instructions or
Conclusions of Law
Miscellaneous
.

1
0
0
0

7
7a
1

0

5

0

1

2

80

a One case reversed in part for prosecutorial misconduct.
TABLE III
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Civil Cases
Judge Only
Affirmed
Reversed on Findings or
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Reversed for Evidentiary Errors
Reversed for Judicial Misconduct
Reversed on Instructions or
Conclusions of -Law

15
5
3
..0

Total
a
b

282

One case reversed in part.
Also reversed for error in regards to instructions

.

Jury

43
6A
6
lb

5

4

28

60
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TABLE IV "

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Criminal Cases
Judge Only

Jury
83

16

Affirmed
Reversed on Findings or
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Reversed for Evidentiary Errors
Reversed for Prosecutorial Misconduct
Reversed for Judicial Misconduct
Reversed on Instructions or
Conclusion of Law
Miscellaneous
Total

2a
0
0
0

7b

0
1

3
3

19

106

5
3C
2d

a Both cases reversed in respect only to certain defendants.
One case also reversed on evidentiary grounds; one defendant in another case also
received a new trial on evidentiary grounds, two cases were reversed only in respect to
one defendant and a fifth case was reversed only in respect to one count.
e One case was also reversed for judicial misconduct and another was also reversed
because of inadequate counsel.
d One case was also reversed 'for prosecutorial misconduct.
b

TABLE V
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DiSTRiucr

OF COLUMBIA

Criminal Cases
United States v. Evans, 277 F.2d 354 (1960) (evidence).
United States v. Dancy, 276 F.2d 521 (1960) (evidence).
Polisnik v. United States, 259 F.2d,951 (1958) (judicial conduct).
United States v. Taylor, 260 F.2d 737 (1958) (evidence).
Edmonds v. United States, 260 F.2d 474 (1958) (en banc) (evidence).
United States v. Belton, 259 F.2d 811 (1958)-(en banc) (evidence and prosecutorial misconduct).
United States v. Fenwick, 252 F.2d 124 (1958) (evidence).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Criminal Cases
None
TABLE VI
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Cases
Lewis v. Chapman, 265 F.2d 345 (1959).
D.C. v. Elliot, 262 F.2d 218 (1958).
Phillips v. Madison & Pub. Inv. Corp., 254 F.2d 348 (1958).
Romer v. Capital Products, Inc., 252 F.2d 843 (1958).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DIracr

United
United
-United
United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States
States
States
States

OF COLUMBIA

Criminal Cases
v. Heinecke, 294 F.2d 727 (1961).
v. Licavoli, 294 F.2d 207 (1961).
v. James, 269 F.2d 245 (1959).
v. Ross, 267 F.2d 618 (1959).
v. Kornegay, 258 F.2d 418 (1958).
v. Lyles, 254 F.2d 725 (1957) (en banc).
v. Accardo, 249 F.2d 519 (1957).
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TABLE VI (Continued)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Civil Cases
Pauling v. New York News Syndicate, 335 F.2d 659 (1964).
Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 F.2d 936 (1964).
United States Lines v. Fitzgerald, 306 F.2d 461 (1962).
Blue v. Pennsylvania R.R., 301 F.2d 450 (1962).
Usiak v. New York Barge Co., 299 F.2d 808 (1962).
McNamara v. Dionne, 298 F.2d 352 (1962).
Camina v. Carolina Carriers, 297 F.2d 530 (1962).
Rofrano v. Duffy, 291 F.2d 848 (1961).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States
States

Criminal Cases
v. Isadore Press Co., 336 F.2d 1003 (1964).
v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (1964).
v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (1964).
v. Guidarelli, 318 F.2d 523 (1963).
V. Whiting, 308 F.2d 537 (1962).
v. Klein, 306 F.2d 13 (1962).
v. Crisafi, 304 F.2d 803 (1962).
v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (1962).
v. Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807 (1962).
v. Frascone, 299 F.2d 824 (1962).
v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (1961).
v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457 (1961).
v. Passero, 290 F.2d 238 (1961).
v. Gross, 286 F.2d 59 (1961).
v. Smith, 283 F.2d 760 (1960).
v. Williams, 282 F.2d 899 (1960).
TABLE VII,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

United States v. Howard, 278 F.2d 872 (1960) (evidence).
Abrams v. Gordon, 276 F.2d 500 (1960) (evidence).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 319 F.2d 12 (1963) (evidence).
United States v. 18.43 Acres of Land, 312 F.2d 287 (1963) (evidence).
United States v. New York Trade Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (1962) (evidence).
United States v. Tomaiolo, 286 F.2d 568 (1961) (evidence).
Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340 (1961) (evidence).

TABLE VIII
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

United States v. Taylor, 260 F.2d 737 (1958) (conspiracy count).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490 (19641 (evidence).
United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (1963) (judicial misconduct).
United States v. Persico, 305 F.2d 534 (1962) (prosecutorial and judicial misconduct).
Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (1962) (evidence).
United States v. 158.76 Acres of Land, 298 F.2d 559 (1962).
Rheaume v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 611 (1961).
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TABLE IX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

United States v. Frank, 262 F.2d 695 (1958) (prosecutorial misconduct).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

United
United
United
United
United
United

States
States
States
States
States
States

v. Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278 (1964) (prosecutorial misconduct).
v. Bugros, 304 F.2d 177 (1962) (prosecutorial misconduct).
v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576 (1962) (evidence).
v. Salazar, 293 F.2d 442 (1961) (judicial misconduct).
v. Turoff, 291 F.2d 864 (1961) (evidence).
v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (1961) (judicial misconduct).
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